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The Anticipation Misconception
Colin P. Marks1
I.Introduction
Imagine that your client calls to obtain advice regarding
the adequacy of the warnings and instructions on a new medical
product prior to releasing the product on the market. After
reviewing the product, its warnings and background information,
you prepare drafts of a memorandum and make numerous notes to
yourself regarding the possible legal liability associated with the
product. Finally, you send the client a memorandum outlining
your thoughts and advice for reducing litigation risks. Some years
later, litigation arises surrounding the product and the plaintiffs
request to see the memorandum you prepared regarding potential
liability as well as any notes and materials used to create such
memorandum. Your client refuses to produce the requested
memorandum and materials on the grounds that it is protected by
both the attorney client privilege and work product doctrine.
Though the memorandum may seem to be clearly protected by the
attorney-client privilege, does the work product doctrine truly
apply? And are the attorney’s notes, drafts and research trails that
were not shared with the client protected under the work product
doctrine? The likely answer to these questions is “no” simply by
virtue of the fact that they may not be deemed to have been
prepared in “anticipation of litigation,” as that term is often

1
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interpreted as litigation being more than a remote possibility.2
Adding to this confusion is disagreement upon whether the
materials sought must be created in preparation of litigation or if it
is permissible that some other business purpose also played a role
in their creation, the latter being excluded under the term
“anticipation of litigation” in some jurisdictions.
Many commentators and courts have cited to the Supreme
Court decision of Hickman v. Taylor as the genesis of the work
product doctrine and the requirement that, to be afforded
protection, the material in question must be generated “in
anticipation of litigation.”3 The oft quoted policy justification for
the protection afforded is that attorneys should be allowed a “zone
of privacy” within which to prepare their case for the client.4 This
2

See, e.g., Diversified Indus. Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603-04 (8th Cir.
1977) (emphasizing that “anticipation of litigation” is the keystone to work
product protection, and denying work product protection to a document that was
clearly opinion work product, but prepared before litigation was anticipated).
3
See, e.g., Liesa L. Richter, The Power of Privilege and the Attorney-Client
Privilege Protection Act: How Corporate America has Everyone Excite About
the Emperor’s New Clothes, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 979, 1031 (2008) (citing
to the Hickman decision as support that “the work-product doctrine provides
additional protection for the work product of an attorney made in anticipation of
litigation.”); Latieke M. Lyles, Cooperation or Coercion?: Why Selective
Waiver is Needed in Government Investigations, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1291,
1297 (2008); Keith Paul Bishop, The McNulty Memo – Continuing the
Disappointment, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 729, 731 n.10; Thomas C. Pearson,
Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in the Post-Sox Environment, 86 NEB. L.
REV. 43, 96 n.348 (2007); Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration:
Beyond the Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1295 (2006); Pacific Fisheries, Inc.
v. United States, 539 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2008); Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians of Florida v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008);
Dairyland Power Co-op v. United States, 79 Fed.Cl. 709, 721 (Fed. Cl. 2007);
AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 444-45 (Fed. Cl. 2007);
Regional Airport Authority of Louisville v. LFG, L.L.C., 460 F.3d 697, 713
(6th Cir. 2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F.3d 511, 520 (6th Cir. 2006);
Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 668 (10th
Cir. 2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Oct. 22, 2001, 282 F.3d 156, 160
(2d Cir. 2002); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 924
(8th Cir. 1997); Cabot v. United States, 35 Fed.Cl. 442, 445 (Fed. Cl. 1996).
4
See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. U.S., 69 Fed.Cl. 784, 789 (Fed. Cl.
2006) (asserting that the work product doctrine is intended to preserve a zone of
2
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justification supports limiting protection to only work generated
“in anticipation of litigation,” because, presumably, outside of this
context there is no need for the “zone of privacy.” However, a
closer reading of Hickman reveals that, though the facts of that
case involved preparation for trial, the Supreme Court placed no
such limit on the scope of protection afforded an attorney’s
“mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories,”5
known as “core” work product. In fact, the Supreme Court made
very clear that such materials should be afforded special
protection, above and beyond that afforded “ordinary” work
product, which includes “written or oral information transmitted to
the attorney and recorded as conveyed by the client.”6
Furthermore, though the “zone of privacy” justification was used
by the Court, a much broader concern for the effect discovery of
such materials would have on the attorney-client relationship was
also articulated.
This policy concern shares much in common with the
instrumental policy justification that is at the heart of the attorneyclient privilege. Thus, a review of Hickman reveals at least two
commonly held misconceptions about that case: 1) that it requires
“core” work product to be produced in “anticipation of litigation”
before protection can attach and 2) that the sole justification for
the protection is to create a “zone of privacy” within which the
attorney can work. Together, these misconceptions have produced
problems that should be of concern to both the practitioner and
academic. From a practical standpoint, these misconceptions have
privacy where an attorney can prepare and develop his legal strategy); Hobley
v. Burge, 433 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2006) (identifying the purpose of the work
product doctrine as establishing a zone of privacy in which lawyers can analyze
their case free from interference by an adversary); Hanson v. U.S. Agency for
Intern. Development, 372 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (indicating that the
work product doctrine serves to provide a zone of privacy within which to plan
for a case); United States. v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998)
(stating the purpose of the work product doctrine is to preserve a zone of
privacy in which an attorney can prepare their case);United States v. AT&T
Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
5
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
6
In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 163 (6th Cir. 1986).
3
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limited the scope of coverage given to the attorney’s “core” work
product causing problems with knowing what in the attorney’s file
will be discoverable. Furthermore, as different jurisdictions have
adopted varying standards, attorneys must deal with a lack of
uniformity when it comes to protecting work product.
Academically, these misconceptions are troubling because they
have resulted in a system that encourages forum shopping and
creates distinctions without any meaning or justification.
This article examines both the work product doctrine’s
historical and philosophical roots to determine whether the
“anticipation of litigation” requirement should be a bar to
protection of “core” work product from discovery. Part II
examines the current state of the work product doctrine through
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) and case law and
compares the doctrine with the attorney-client privilege. Part II
concludes by demonstrating how “core” work product can be
discovered despite the protection of these two doctrines. Part III
examines the Hickman v. Taylor case within its historical context,
starting with the enactment of the first Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938 and concluding with an analysis of the Court’s
decision itself. Part IV discusses the subsequent interpretations of
Hickman v. Taylor, and how the “anticipation of litigation”
requirement, or anticipation misconception, got its start through,
of all things, a student note in the Harvard Law Review. Part IV
concludes with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s interpretations
of Rule 26(b) as it currently exists.
Finally, Part V examines the “anticipation of litigation”
requirement in light of this historical development and proposes
that the requirement is unjustified historically, philosophically and
as a matter of policy. Part V, therefore, proposes that, with regard
to core work product, a new exception be established, or rather
recognition that an old exception continues to exist. This
exception, based upon Hickman, would afford “core” work
product a residuum of protection from discovery, regardless of the
context in which it was created, so long as it was created by an
attorney in his or her role of providing legal assistance. Such an
exception to discovery would grant “core” work product a
4
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privileged status similar to that received by attorney-client
communications, a result that makes sense when the instrumental
policy justification for the doctrine is taken into account.
Recognition of this protection will be more in keeping with the
holding of Hickman and will help dispel uncertainty as to the
scope of the doctrine due to the various readings courts have given
to the term “anticipation of litigation.”
II.The Work Product Doctrine
Before delving into the historical and philosophical
underpinnings of the work product doctrine, a brief overview of
the doctrine as it stands today is necessary to demonstrate how the
anticipation of litigation requirement can be problematic. Because
parties often seek to protect material under both the work product
doctrine and the attorney-client privilege, a brief review of the
attorney-client privilege is in order as well as a discussion of how
these protections differ. Although these doctrines cover slightly
different materials, their philosophical underpinnings actually
have much in common.
A.Work Product Doctrine Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(3)
1. The scope of work product protection
In short, the work product doctrine grants a qualified
privilege to the work product of a party or its agents.7 While the
work product doctrine in the civil context has its roots in the 1946
United States Supreme Court case of Hickman v. Taylor, today the
7

Chiasson v. Zapata Gulf Marine Corp., 988 F.2d 513, 514 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 474 (1996); Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S.
Dist. Court for Dist. of Arizona, 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1989);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Phillippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir.
1991); Charles M. Yablon & Steven S. Sparling, United States v. Adlman:
Protection for Corporate Work Product?, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 627, 633 (1998);
Jeff A. Anderson et al., The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760,
762 (1983).
5
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Hickman decision has been partially codified in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).8 Rule 26(b)(3) provides:
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials.
(A) Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a
party may not discover documents and tangible
things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial by or for another party or its
representative (including the other party's attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent).
But, subject to Rule 26(b)(4), those materials may
be discovered if:
(i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule
26(b)(1); and
(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for
the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without
undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent
by other means.
(B) Protection Against Disclosure. If the court
orders discovery of those materials, it must protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party's
attorney or other representative concerning the
litigation.9
The rule has been summarized as giving a qualified privilege to
materials that are “(1) documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable, (2) prepared in anticipation of litigation, (3) by or for
another party or by or for that other party’s representative.”10
Though the first of these elements only speaks in terms of
8

FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(3); EDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT AND
WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 795 (5th ed. ABA 2007). The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure offer a similar protection through Rule 16(b)(2). Fed. R.
Crim. Pro. 16(b)(2); EPSTEIN, supra at 795. Though this article will focus on
the civil rules, reference may be made at some points to the work product
doctrine in criminal context.
9
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(3).
10
EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 797; Anderson, supra n. 7, at 792.
6
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“documents and tangible things,” the protection also is afforded to
intangible things such as the recollections of an attorney or party
requested through an interrogatory via the original Hickman
decision.11
The second requirement that work product be “prepared in
anticipation of litigation” presents difficulties in interpretation.
Courts have responded to this by adopting a variety of approaches
for when something actually meets this criteria.12 As one
commentator has noted, there appears to be, at its core, two factors
required for work product protection to apply: “there must be a
threat of litigation and there must be a motivational component.”13
As for the first factor, one issue that arises is whether the action
threatened qualifies as “litigation.” The Federal Rules do not
define “litigation,” but courts generally have broadened the term to
apply beyond merely litigation is federal district courts so as to
extend to other “adversarial proceedings.”14 Thus, documents
prepared for compliance with federal securities laws have not been

11

EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 815; RICHARD L. MARCUS, The Story of Hickman:
Preserving Adversarial Incentives While Embracing Broad Discovery, in CIVIL
PROCEDURE STORIES, at 349 (2d ed. Foundation Press 2008, Kevin M. Clermont
editor); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2024 (West 1994); In re Cendant Securities Litig. 343 F.3d 658, 662-63 (3d Cir.
2003); In re Grand Jury, 473 F.2d 840, 845-46 (8th Cir. 1973); Henry S.
Noyes, Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Stirring the State Law of Privilege and
Professional Responsibility with a Federal Stick, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 673,
762 (2009).
12
6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL § 26.70
(3d ed. 2007) (section authored by Patrick E. Higginbotham) (“Courts have
devised various formulations regarding just how concrete the prospect of
litigation must be before protection will attach to a given document.”);
Anderson, supra n 7, at 845.
13
EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 825 (citing Marten v. Yellow Freight Sys., 1998 WL
13244, at *10 (D. Kan. 1998)).
14
EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 826-27; Jerold S. Solovy et al., Protecting Confidential
Legal Information: A Handbook for Analyzing Issues Under the Attorney
Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 797 PLI/Lit 225, 491 (2009);
Willingham v. Ashcroft, 228 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2005); Deseret Mgmt. Corp. v.
United States, 76 Fed.Cl. 88, 92-93 (Fed.Cl. 2007).
7
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15

afforded work product protection, nor have the notes of an
attorney taken during a conference call with the Food and Drug
Administration regarding the failure rate of a medical device
because no investigation was pending, and thus the documents
were not prepared for “litigation.”16 Similarly, documents
prepared in anticipation of a governmental investigation have not
been granted work product protection,17 but once a governmental
investigation has actually commenced, the work product doctrine
may apply as the prospect of litigation is no longer remote.18
This leads to yet another problem with applying the workproduct doctrine; when is litigation “anticipated”? The term
“anticipation” is also not defined by the Federal Rules leading
courts to again apply various standards. Analyzing whether work
product was produced in anticipation of litigation often requires an
inquiry into both the temporality of the threatened adversarial
proceeding as well as an inquiry into the second motivational
factor cited by above.19 As to the temporality of the litigation,
where a proceeding has actually been initiated, the requirement is
met, but the doctrine does not require that a suit be filed for the

15

Biddison v. Chicago, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3991, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1989);
EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 829-30 (citing same).
16
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130, 156 (D. Mass. 2004); EPSTEIN,
supra n. 8, at 830 (citing same).
17
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130, 147 (D. Mass. 2004); Guzzino v.
Felterman, 174 F.R.D. 59, 63 (W.D. La. 1997); WRIGHT ET AL., supra n. 10, §
2024; EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 831.
18
Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minebea Co., 918 F. Supp. 491, 513 (D.N.H. 1996);
EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 831-32 (citing same). See also In re Int’l Sys. &
Controls Corp. Securities Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1239 and n.4 (5th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Amerada Hess Corp. 619 F.2d 980, 987 (3d Cir. 1980); Garrett
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1996 WL 325725, at *3 (S.D. N.Y. 1996) (citing
Martin v. Bally’s Park Place Hotel and Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1261 (3d Cir.
1993)).
19
EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 836; Equal Rights Center v. Post Properties, Inc., 247
F.R.D. 208, 210 (D. D.C. 2008); Fago v. M&T Mortgage Corp., 242 FRD 16,
23 (D. D.C. 2007); Amway Corp. v. The Procter & Gamble Co., 2001 WL
1818698, at *6 (W.D. Mich. 2001); Evans v. Atwood, 177 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D. D.C.
1997).
8
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20

protection to apply. It is in this pre-suit context that the
temporality requirement is at its most chimerical. It is often stated
that the chance of litigation must be more than a mere
possibility.21 “In general . . . a party must show more than a
remote prospect, an inchoate possibility, or a likely chance of
litigation.”22 Courts, however, vary on the level of temporality
they will require, with some courts requiring a very high level of
imminence while others seem content with a much lesser degree of
imminence.23 For instance, some courts have interpreted “in
anticipation of litigation” to mean that protection will only extend
to work product prepared “under the supervision of an attorney in
preparation for the real and imminent threat of litigation or trial.”24
However, other courts have quoted a more liberal standard,
requiring that there exists “a subjective belief that litigation was a
real possibility, and that belief must [be] objectively reasonable,”25
or an even less demanding standard that the alleged work product
was prepared “with an eye toward litigation.”26 This variance in
the stringency of what qualifies as work product, due to when
litigation is “anticipated,” has created a lack of uniformity across

20

Epstein, supra n. 8, at 837; United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1200 (2d
Cir. 1998); Grinnell Corp. v. ITT Corp., 222 F.R.D. 74, 78 (S.D. N.Y. 2003);
Collins v. Mullins, 170 F.R.D. 132, 135-36 (W.D. Pa. 1996).
21
Solovy et al., supra n. 14, at 492; John M. Burman, The Work Product
Doctrine, WYOMING LAWYER 38, 41, April 2006; Diversified Indus., Inc. v.
Meredith 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1978); Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat’l Corp., 64
F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D. N.Y. 1974).
22
In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 214 F.R.D. 178, 183 (D.N.J. 2003).
23
Epstein, supra n. 8, at 850-51; Anderson, supra n. 7, at 845-46.
24
Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 2006 WL 266599 at *10 (D. Kan.
2006); Banks v. United States, 2005 WL 974723 at *3 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (“In
determining whether documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation, the
court should consider whether the documents would not have been generated
but for the pendency or imminence of litigation.”).
25
In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v.
Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2006); Martin v. Bally’s Park Place
Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1993); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992).
26
United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing to
Hickman); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D. D.C. 1982).
9
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judicial districts and has the undesirable effect of increasing the
likelihood of forum shopping.
Even if the documents are prepared for an adversarial
proceeding qualifying as “litigation” and the temporality
requirement is met, protection will not be afforded if the
motivation for creating the document was not based upon the
threatened litigation. For instance, many documents may have
been produced for a business purpose, as well as for litigation.
Such dual-purpose documents raise doubts as to whether the
documents were truly created in anticipation of litigation.27 There
is a split between circuits as to what is the correct degree of
motivation required. The Fifth Circuit has articulated a standard
for “anticipation of litigation” whereby the privilege can apply
where litigation is not imminent, “as long as the primary
motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid
in possible future litigation.”28 The Second Circuit, in United
States v. Adlman, has rejected the “primary motivating purpose”
test and instead opted for the “because of” rule whereby
“documents should be deemed prepared ‘in anticipation of
litigation,’ . . . if in light of the nature of the document and the
factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be
said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of
litigation.”29 The standard adopted by the Second Circuit is a
direct adoption of the standard advanced by Charles Wright and
27

See, e.g., Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 200 F.R.D. 661, 674 (D. Kan.
2001) (stretching the concept of creation for a business purpose by finding that
the defendant, R.J. Reynolds was in the business of litigation, and thus,
“documents prepared in the ordinary course of that business of litigation
without a tie to specific litigation are not protected by work product
immunity.”).
28
United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981). But see In re
Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Roxworthy,
457 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2006); Martin v. Bally’s Park Place Hotel & Casino,
983 F.2d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1993); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet
Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992).
29
Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202-03 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in
original) (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2024, at 343 (1994)).
10
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Arthur Miller in their treatise Federal Practice and Procedure.30
Wright and Miller encourage adoption of the “because of”
standard, stating, “the test should be whether, in light of the nature
of the document and the factual situation in the particular case, the
document can be fairly said to have been prepared or obtained
because of the prospect of litigation.”31 Indeed, a number of
circuits have joined the Second Circuit in adopting this approach
in varying contexts, including the First,32 Third,33 Seventh,34
Eighth,35 Ninth36 and D.C. Circuits.37 The standard itself could be
open to multiple interpretations, however, and has not created a
uniform standard.
2. Production of work product under 26(b)(3)(ii)
As has already been noted, the work product doctrine is not
a true privilege but a qualified privilege. Thus, even if a party has
carried its burden and shown the applicability of the work product
doctrine, that does not end the inquiry. The party seeking
production then carries the burden of showing the applicability of
26(b)(3)(ii), i.e. a substantial need for the materials to prepare its
case and an inability to obtain it by other methods without undue
hardship.38
In applying this rule, courts make a distinction between
ordinary or “fact” work product and “opinion” or “core” work
product.39 Ordinary work product has been defined as the “written

30

WRIGHT ET AL., supra n. 11, at § 2024.
Id.
32
State of Maine v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002).
33
Montgomery County v. MicroVote Corp., 175 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 1999).
34
Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1996).
35
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson L.L.P., 305 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir.
2002).
36
In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mark Torf/ Torf Environ. Mgmt.), 357 F.3d 900,
907 (9th Cir. 2004).
37
E.E.O.C. v. Lutheran Social Serv., 186 F.3d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
38
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(3)(ii); Epstein, supra n. 8, at 811.
39
In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289,
294 (6th Cir. 2002).

31

11
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or oral information transmitted to the attorney and recorded as
conveyed by the client.”40 Such ordinary work product may be
obtained, despite the privilege, by meeting the above test, i.e. upon
a showing of substantial need and an inability to otherwise obtain
the privileged work product without material hardship.41 But
courts, based on the language of Rule 26(b) and the Hickman
decision itself, give special protection to core work product.
“[A]bsent waiver, a party may not obtain the ‘opinion’ work
product of his adversary; i.e., ‘any material reflecting the
attorney’s mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, judgments,
or legal theories.’”42 Thus, core work product enjoys a greater
level of protection than fact or ordinary work product but even the
extent of that heightened protection is somewhat unclear. While
some courts have articulated an absolute protection to “core” work
product, many others, including the United States Supreme Court,
have stopped short of affording it such status.43
B.The Work Product Rule Distinguished From Attorney-Client
Privilege
1.The attorney-client privilege and how it is applied
In diversity cases, federal law mandates that state law
governs the attorney-client privilege.44 However, if the court’s
jurisdiction is premised upon a federal question, the attorney-client
privilege is defined by federal common law.45 The elements of the
attorney-client privilege are satisfied: “(1) Where legal advice of
any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his
40

In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 163 (6th Cir. 1986).
Toledo Edison Co. v. G.A. Technologies, Inc., 847 F.2d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir.
1988); Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 744 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1984). In
this sense, the work-product privilege is not an absolute privilege, but more akin
to a qualified privilege. EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 797.
42
In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F. 3d at 294 (quoting In re Antitrust Grand Jury,
805 F.2d at 163-64).
43
EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 947-50.
44
FED. R. EVID. 501.
45
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1996).

41
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capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence (5) by the client (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or the legal
advisor, (8) unless the protection is waived.”46 A more succinct
statement of the privilege is that a party must show: “(1) a
communication; (2) made between privileged persons; (3) in
confidence;(4) for the purpose of seeking, obtaining, or providing
legal assistance to the client.47

46

Banner v. Hamilton, 99 Fed.Appx. 29, 36 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing to Reed v.
Baxter, 134 F.3d 351, 355-56 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bisanti, 414 F.3d
168, 171 (1st Cir. 2005) (articulating nearly identical standard).
47
EPSTEIN, supra n. 8, at 65 (citing Restatement, The Law Governing Lawyers §
118 (Tentative Draft No.1, 1988)); Wilson v. Foti, 2004 WL 744874 at * 2
(E.D. La. 2004) (citing EPSTEIN); see also Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 395
(discussing elements of confidentiality and communication); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (confidential disclosures by a client to an
attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance are privileged); Colin P.
Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective
Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE L. REV. 155, 158
(2006). Though individual state and federal courts have articulated variations
of this standard, these four basic prongs remain consistent. For instance, the
Third Circuit in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979)
described the elements as:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become
a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made
(a) is the member of the bar of court, or his subordinate and
(b) in connection with this communication is acting as a
lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the
presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal services or (iii)
assistance in some legal preceding, and not (d) for the propose
of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been
(a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id. at 1233. Though this standard adds some nuances, such as the crime-fraud
exception to the privilege, the basic standard remains the same. Furthermore,
though this standard is articulated in terms of communications from a client to
an attorney, the privilege also covers communications from an attorney to a
client. Lewis v. UNUM Corp. Severance Plan, 203 F.R.D. 615, 618 (D. Kan.
2001) (citing Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1370-71 (10th
Cir.1997)).
13
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There are a few notable exceptions to the privilege.
Disclosure of communications to third parties can lead to a waiver
of the privilege.48 Also the communication must be for the
purpose of securing legal advice as opposed to securing general
business advice.49 Where an in-house counsel also serves in a
business role, the inquiry can be difficult, requiring a hard look
into whether the communication was made for a business as
opposed to a legal purpose. “Business communications are not
protected merely because they are directed to an attorney, and
communications at meetings attended or directed by attorneys are
not automatically privileged as a result of the attorney’s
presence.”50 Thus, in cases where in-house counsel serve a dual
legal/business role, courts will look at the nature of the
communication to determine whether the primary purpose of the
communication was to provide legal assistance.51
48

Marks, supra n. 47, at 159.
Id.
50
Kramer v. Raymond Corp., 1992 WL 122856 at * 1 (E.D. Pa. 1992). At one
time, many federal courts adopted a “control group” test to determine if
communications between corporate employees and the corporate counsel were
covered by the privileged. See Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. at 42-43. Under this test,
“the privilege applied if the employee making the communication was in a
position to control or take a substantial part in a decision about any action
which the corporation might take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he was
an authorized member of a body or group which had the authority, such that he,
in effect, personified the corporation.” Marks, supra, n. 47, at 162. However,
this approach was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in 1981 in Upjohn
Company v. United States. 449 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1981); National Converting
& Fulfillment Corp. v. Bankers Trust Corp., 134 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 n. 1
(N.D. Tex. 2001). Today, under federal law, “communications from lower
echelon employees are within the privilege as long as the communications are
made to the attorney to assist him in giving legal advice to the client
corporation.” Marks, supra n. 47, at 163; Painewebber Group, Inc. v.
Zinsmeyer Trusts Partnership, 187 F.3d 988, 991-92 (8th Cir. 1999); United
States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Upjohn, 449
U.S. at 391-92).
51
Kramer v. Raymond Corp., 1992 WL 122856 at * 1 (E.D. Pa. 1992); MSF
Holding, Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, 2005 WL 3338510 at *1 (S.D. N.Y.
2005); Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F.Supp. 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Two
other notable exceptions are that underlying facts are not protected, Upjohn, 449
U.S. at 395-96; United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1, *3-4 (1st Cir. 1999); Rhone-

49
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2. Policy justifications for the attorney-client privilege
The attorney-client privilege has been said to be one of the
oldest existing legal privileges, dating back to ancient Rome,
where it was initially used as a means to prevent an attorney from
being called as a witness in his client’s case.52 The justifications
for the attorney-client privilege have evolved over the years.
Today, the most commonly cited policy supporting existence of
the privilege is that open and frank communications with an
attorney facilitates compliance with the law.53 Thus, the privilege
exists to promote full disclosure by the client and to foster a
relationship of trust between the attorney and the client.54 This
justification has been labeled an “instrumental” one in that the
privilege serves as an instrument, or a means, to an end – that end
being communications between attorney and client.55 At its heart,
this justification is based upon an assumption that without the

Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 (3d Cir. 1994), and
the privilege does not apply to communications concerning an intended or
continuing crime under the crime-fraud exception. See JOHN WILLIAM
GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 4.03 (3d ed. 2001).
52
JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 1.04
at 1-3 - 1-4 (3d ed. 2001). Wigmore described the privilege as being an
accepted part of English law, however, this notion has come under attack as
being inaccurate and possibly was nothing more than a makeweight to
“distinguish [the attorney client privilege] from those that Wigmore chose to
deprecate as ‘novel privileges.’” CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT AND KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE §
5472 (2d ed. West 2005) (1977).
53
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1978) (“The privilege is also considered
necessary to the lawyer’s function as confidential counselor in law or the
similar theory that the legal counselor can properly advise the client what to do
only if the client is free to make full disclosure.”).
54
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348
(1985); Palmer v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 861 P.2d 895, 904-05 (Mont. 1993).
55
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE §
5.1.1 at 257 (Aspen 2002).
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privilege, clients will not disclose necessary facts to the attorney.56
Thus, the privilege has been described, from a cost-benefit standpoint, as cost-free to society as, without the privilege, the evidence
at issue would not have been disclosed and discoverable in the
first place.57
Not surprisingly, because the attorney-client privilege is
based upon an assumed benefit, it has been criticized as
speculative and its benefits called into question.58 This has caused
some commentators to offer up alternative, “non-instrumental”
justifications for the privilege, such as a humanistic privacy
justification.59 Imwinkelried distinguishes this justification from
Wigmore’s noting that, “[u]nlike Wigmore’s theory, the
humanistic rationale does not rest on the factual assumption of a
causal connection. Rather, the rationale is that it is desirable to
create certain privileges out of respect for personal rights such as
autonomy or privacy.”60 This privacy concern mirrors a primary
justification that is often cited to when explaining the work
product doctrine – the benefits of having a “zone of privacy”
within which an attorney can work. Nonetheless, this humanistic
policy justification has not overtaken the instrumental justification

56

Id. at § 5.1.1 at 258; Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408
(1998).
57
IMWINKELRIED, supra n. 55, at §5.1.1, at 258. Interestingly, at one time, the
paradigm for this justification was in the context of a trial lawyer being
consulted for the purposes of litigation, before the rise of the in-house counsel,
but the justification has been extended to the in-house counsel context as well.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra n. 52, at § 5472; Vincent C. Alexander, The
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 191, 267-68 (1989) (“Interestingly, for several decades of its common
law existence, the attorney-client privilege encompassed only communications
relating to the litigation in which the lawyer's testimony was sought. It was not
until the mid-1800s that the privilege was held to include communications
relating to ‘legal advice of any kind’.”); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2294
(McNaughton rev.ed.1961).
58
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra n. 52, at § 5472; IMWINKELRIED, supra n. 55, at
§5.2.1, at 266-67.
59
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra n. 52, at § 5472; IMWINKELRIED, supra n. 55, at
§5.1.2.
60
IMWINKELRIED, supra n. 55, at §5.1.2, at 259.
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and the Supreme Court has continued to cite approvingly to the
instrumental justification in recognizing new privileges.61
3.

Coverage under the attorney-client privilege versus
the work product doctrine

It has been said that the scope of the work product doctrine
is both broader than and narrower than the attorney-client
privilege.62 It is broader in that it extends to materials beyond just
communications.63 However, it is narrower in that it only extends
to materials created “in anticipation of litigation.”64 In some

61

Id. at § 5.1.1, at 258; Jafee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996); United
States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1989).
62
Compare United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975)(“[T]he
work-product doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client
privilege.”) and In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.,
293 F.3d 289, 304 (6th Cir. 2002) and In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d
619, 624 (4th Cir. 1988) with In re OM Sec. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 579, 587 (N.D.
Ohio 2005) (noting, inversely, that the attorney-client privilege is broader than
the work product doctrine). See also Fred A. Simpson, Has the Fog Cleared?
Attorney Work Product and the Attorney-Client Privilege: Texas’s Complete
Transition into Full Protection of Attorney Work in the Corporate Context, 32
ST. MARY’S L. J. 197, 225-26 (2001) (“The work product doctrine provides a
greater area of protection than the attorney-client privilege. In spite of its broad
application, work product does not protect documents or tangible items not
created in anticipation of litigation.”); Kevin Mark Smith, Preventing Discovery
of Internal Investigation Materials: Protecting Oneself From One’s Own
Petard, 69 J. KAN. B. ASSOC. 28, 35 (2000) (“Because the work product
doctrine is narrower in scope than the attorney-client privilege in that it only
applies when litigation is ongoing or pending, an entity must next determine
whether the investigation is being conducted as a result of pending litigation.”);
Kim J. Gruetzmacher, Comment, Privileged Communications with
Accountants: The Demise of United States v. Kovel, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 977,
989 (2003) (“The attorney work product doctrine is at once broader and
narrower than the attorney-client privilege.”).
63
In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 304 (“[T]he ‘work product doctrine is
distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege’ and extends beyond
confidential communications between the attorney and client to ‘any document
prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for the attorney.’”).
64
Gabriel L. Imperato, Internal Investigations, Government Investigations,
Whistleblower Concerns: Techniques to Protect Your Health Care
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instances, this coverage may overlap. For instance, in the
hypothetical posited at the beginning of this article in which
litigation over a client’s product ensued, a memorandum prepared
and given to the client assessing the merits of the pending case or
cases would likely have dual coverage under both the attorneyclient privilege (as the memorandum is a communication) and the
work product doctrine (as the memorandum was created in
anticipation of litigation). But returning to the documents at issue
in the introductory hypothetical, would there be any protection for
the drafts of a memorandum and attorneys’ notes in his or her file
regarding the possible legal liability? Any memoranda that are
given to the client may come under the protection of the attorneyclient privilege, but drafts, notes, and possibly even research trails
created by the attorney could all be subject to discovery. Though
these materials will all likely contain or reflect the mental
impressions of the attorney, they were created pre-launch, at a
time when litigation was remote. In other words, though the
materials may represent core work product, to fall under the
protection of the work product doctrine, even core material must
be produced “in anticipation of litigation.”65
This limitation can pose a significant problem for the
transactional attorney. As Professor Roger Kirst has noted,
It seems unlikely that a transaction document will
be found to have been created in anticipation of
litigation as required by Rule 26(b)(3) to meet the
Organization, 51 ALA. L. REV. 205, 216 (1999) (“The key to this protection is
that the work must be performed in anticipation of litigation.”).
65
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §2026 (2009) (“As with all assertions of workproduct protection, opinion work product is guarded against discovery only if
prepared in anticipation of trial; mental impressions of an attorney in service of
other objectives, such as negotiation of a transaction, are not protected.”); Duke
T. Oishi, A Piece of Mind for Peace of Mind: Federal Discoverability of
Opinion Work Product Provided to Expert Witnesses and its Implications in
Hawai’i, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 859, 864 (2002); Ettie Ward, The Litigator’s
Dilemma: Waiver of Core Work Product Used in Trial Preparation, 62 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 515, 516-17 (1988); Anderson et al., supra n. 7, at 820; Robert
D. Stokes, Discovering Investigative Reports Under the Work Product
Doctrine, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 156, 159-60 (1982).
18

COLIN P. MARKS – THE ANTICIPATION MISCONCEPTION

3/10/2010 11:52:04 AM

definition of litigation work product. That leaves
the attorney-client privilege as the obvious ground,
so lawyers regularly rely on that privilege and
assert that the transaction documents they wrote or
edited are protected from discovery by the attorneyclient privilege. Thus, the issue in the federal
caselaw on discovery of transaction work product
has been whether such material is privileged. The
federal courts have almost always held that the
federal law of the attorney-client privilege does not
protect documents that do not reveal the client's
confidential communications.66
The case of Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp.67 illustrates the difficulty
of protecting attorney work product in a patent prosecution
context. In Hercules, Hercules sued Exxon for infringement of a
patent that disclosed a type of artificial rubber.68 During
discovery, Hercules refused to produce 255 requested documents
claiming that the documents were protected by either the attorneyclient privilege or work product doctrine.69 The district court
began its inquiry by classifying the documents into categories such
as “Documents relating to the prosecution of the application for
the patent in suit,” or documents relating to a particular
interference suit.70 The court then analyzed the documents under
66

Roger W. Kirst, A Third Option: Regulating Discovery of Transaction Work
Product Without Distorting the Attorney-Client Privilege, 31 SETON HALL L.
REV. 229, 230 (2000). See also Unted States v. Naegele, 468 F.Supp.2d
165,170 (D.D.C. 2007) (“When there is no intent that the communication
remain confidential, the privilege does not attach.”); In re Keeper of the
Records, 348 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The privilege protects only those
communications that are confidential and are made for the purpose of seeking
or receiving legal advice.”); Santrade, Ltd. v. G.E. Co., 150 F.R.D. 539, 542
(E.D. N.Car. 1993) (noting same); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
Dated September 15, 1983, 713 F.22d 1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[The
attorney-client] privilege does not impede disclosure of information except to
the extent that the disclosure would reveal confidential communications.”).
67
434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977).
68
Id. at 141-42.
69
Id. at 142.
70
Id.
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the attorney-client privilege finding that a number of the
communications were not covered by the privilege, in part due to
the communications not being premised upon the rendering of
legal advice.71 The court then turned to the work product doctrine,
analyzing the documents in light of the “anticipation of litigation”
requirement.72 Though the court agreed that an adversarial
proceeding included a patent interference proceeding, it stopped
short of finding that a document prepared to aid in the prosecution
of a patent qualified under the “anticipation of litigation”
requirement.73
The scope of that privilege is still limited, however,
by the requirement that the document be prepared
“with an eye toward litigation.” The prosecution of
an application before the Patent Office is not an
adversary, but an ex parte proceeding. Although
the process involves preparation and defense of
legal claims in a quasi-adjudicatory forum, the
give-and-take of an adversary proceeding is by and
large absent.74
Thus, the court held that a number of the documents, including
drafts with attorneys’ handwritten notes, were subject to
discovery.75
Hercules demonstrates how documents, even ones that
record the mental impressions of attorneys acting in their legal
capacity, will fail to garner protection under the work product
doctrine if litigation is not anticipated. However, transactional

71

Id. at 147-48. It is not entirely clear if the documents may have been subject
to discovery due to some other reason; the court discussed the argument that
some of the communications may not have been to individuals covered by the
privilege but dismissed this attack. Id. at 145-47. The court then discussed the
requirement that the attorney “is ‘acting as a lawyer’ giving advice with respect
to the legal implications of a proposed course of conduct,” and then concluded
that “[o]n the basis of the foregoing, the following documents are not protected
by the attorney-client privilege: . . ..” Id. at 147-48.
72
Id. at 150-51.
73
Id. at 151-52.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 152.
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attorneys are not the only ones who face the prospect of their
mental impressions being open to discovery. As has already been
noted, documents created in anticipation of a government
investigation, but prior to the commencement of the investigation
have also been found to be beyond the scope of the work product
doctrine.76 Indeed, even when a problem has arisen, documents
may not be said to be prepared in anticipation of litigation if the
prospect is still deemed remote.
For instance, in the case of In re Grand Jury Subpoena,77 a
case which in many ways mirrors the hypothetical proposed in the
introduction, a corporation was under investigation by a grand jury
for distributing adulterated and misbranded medical devices in
violation of provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(“FDCA”).78 The device at issue had initially been approved by
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) in 1998 for
manufacture, but prior to, and during the initial period of shipping
the devices, it was discovered that the devices were failing both in
routine tests and in actual shipped devices.79 After a series of calls
involving the corporation’s officers, attorney and the FDA, among
others, the corporation decided to withdraw production of the

76

In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130, 158-59 (D. Mass. 2004); Guzzino
v. Felterman, 174 F.R.D. 59, 63 (W.D. La. 1997); Epstein, supra n. 8, at 831
(citing Guzzino). See also In re Bank One Securities Litig., 209 F.R.D. 418.
425 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that documents prepared in response to an
investigation by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency were not protected
by the work product doctrine because the documents “were not prepared due to
the anticipation of litigation, but rather [arose] from the evolution of business
activities at Bank One as a result of an OCC inquiry.”); In re The Leslie Fay
Cos. Securities Litig., 161 F.R.D. 274, 280 (S.D. N.Y. 1995) (holding that
documents prepared by an audit committee in light of an SEC investigation
were not protected by the work product doctrine because the investigation by
the audit committee “was not conducted primarily in anticipation of litigation .
. ..”) (emphasis in original).
77
220 F.R.D. 130 (D. Mass. 2004).
78
Id. at 133. To ensure that readers of the opinion could not learn the identity of
the corporation or other parties involved, the court created fake names such as
XYZ Corporation. Id. at 134, n.1.
79
Id. at 134.
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80

device. The grand jury sought to compel the corporation’s
attorney to produce the notes he took during these calls with the
FDA.81 The corporation and attorney resisted and sought a
protective order claiming the notes were protected under the work
product doctrine.82
After an extensive review of the work product doctrine,
including its various applications in different jurisdictions, the
court ultimately denied the protective order finding that the notes
were not produced in anticipation of litigation.83 What is striking
about the court’s decision, however, is its rather blunt statement
that the notes were classic core work product. The court stated,
There can be little doubt that if prepared in
anticipation of litigation, an attorney's notes of
conference calls between a client and a regulatory
agency are the sort of materials that the work
product doctrine protects. Indeed, they typically
qualify as opinion work product, because “when
taking notes, an attorney often focuses on those
facts that she deems legally significant.”84
But despite the fact that the notes were clearly taken by the
attorney to aid him in fulfilling his duties to his client, the court
nonetheless found them discoverable. The court ruled that the
notes were not generated in “anticipation of litigation” as the FDA

80

Id. at 136-40.
Id. at 133.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 156-62. The court noted that the corporation and its attorney were in a
Catch-22 of sorts in that if they claimed they anticipated either a lawsuit or
adverse FDA action, this would be based on failures in the field of the device
which would put the company out of compliance with the FDCA and thus the
notes could be discoverable under the crime-fraud exception. Id. at 157-58.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the corporation and attorney had a weak
anticipation showing and had also failed to show that the notes were produced
because of the prospect of litigation. Id. at 162.
84
Id. at 155-56 (quoting Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 209 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th
Cir. 2000)).
81
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had not actually begun an investigation and the prospect of private
litigation was not likely at the time the documents were created.85
What is striking about both Hercules and In re Grand Jury
Subpoena is that in each case, the court recognized that the
documents sought reflected the mental impressions of an attorney
acting in his or her capacity as legal counsel, yet the courts denied
protection of the work product doctrine on an assumption that
work product, even core work product, can only be protected if it
was generated “in anticipation of litigation.” 86 This raises a rather
basic question of whether the assumption that the “anticipation of
litigation” requirement applies to “core” work product is correct or
even justified. The remainder of this article discusses the origin of
what is, in fact, a misunderstanding of the protection that should
be afforded core work product.
III.The Genesis of the Work-Product Rule
As with most articles that address the work-product
doctrine, a discussion of the seminal case of Hickman v. Taylor is
in order. However, a mere recitation of the Supreme Court’s
holding does not do justice to the nuances of the rule or the
purposes for which it was created. To truly understand Hickman,
it is necessary to set-up the historical context in which it was
decided as well as the state of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
as they existed at that time.

85

Id. at 157-62 (stating that “the possibility of litigation must be more than
inchoate”).
86
Id. at 155-62; Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp. 434 F. Supp. 136, 151-52 (D.C.
Del 1977). See also Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d 596, 603-04 (“That the
contents of the report constituted ‘work product’ cannot be denied; nor is there
any question that the report contained the mental impressions, conclusions and
opinions of those who wrote it, including their interpretations of what the
interviews with individuals revealed. However, it was obvious that the Law
Firm’s work was not done in preparation for any trial, and we do not think that
the work was done in “anticipation of litigation,” as that term is used in Rule
26(b)(3), although, of course, all parties concerned must have been aware that
the conduct of employees of Diversified in the years past might ultimately result
in litigation of some sort in the future.”).
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A.The first Rules of Federal Civil Procedure and their
purpose
The first Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938.87
Prior to the adoption of these rules, discovery procedures were
severely limited. The adversarial process reigned supreme and
gamesmanship was the order of the day in litigation.88 Thus, all
discovery, including what would later be termed “work product,”
was often unavailable to the other side except in circumstances
where a court might equitably find that compulsion was required.89
It was in this setting that Roscoe Pound, then Dean of the
University of Nebraska’s College of Law, gave a speech to the
American Bar Association questioning the propriety of a system
that valued the adversarial system over justice.90 This speech
apparently helped initiate efforts which led to the adoption of the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934.91
The first rules covered a variety of matters, including
discovery. The rules represented a stark contrast to the
gamesmanship that had existed prior to their adoption, and indeed,
87

Martin v. Bally’s Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir.
1993); Furman v. Cirrito, 782 F.2d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1986); Henley v. F.M.C.
Corp., 189 F.R.D. 340, n. 8 (S.D. W.Va. 1999); Naragon v. Dayton Power &
Light Co., 934 F. Supp. 899, 903 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Montalvo v. Hutchinson,
837 F. Supp. 576, 577 (S.D. N.Y. 1993); In re Watford, 192 B.R. 276, 279
(Bank. M.D. Ga. 1996).
88
Marcus, supra n. 11, at 326-27; Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-501
(1947) (noting the cumbersome methods of obtaining discovery prior to the
Federal Rules).
89
Marcus, supra n. 11, at 326-27; Jay S. Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversary
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: What Did the Drafters Intend?, 21
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 351, 360 (1987) (noting that “before the new rules, federal
discovery was virtually nonexistent . . ..”).
90
Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice, 29 A.B.A. Rep. 395, 404-05 (1906); Marcus, supra n. 11, at 326
(quoting Pound); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 909, 944-48 (1987).
91
Marcus, supra n. 11, at 328 (quoting John H. Wigmore, Roscoe Pound’s St.
Paul Address of 1906, 20 Judicature 176, 176 (1938).
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it appears there were a number of courts that were wary of them.92
With regard to discovery, the rules formally provided for when
depositions could be taken and their scope,93interrogatories to be
served94 and for the production of documents and things.95
92

Symposium, Discovery Procedure 5 F.R.D. 403, 418-19 (“As I think everyone
in this room knows, under the old practice, before the Rules, the trial of a
lawsuit was more like a sporting proposition: If you got the better lawyer, you
had a better chance of winning; if you could conceal all the facts, you had a
better chance of winning.”) (1946); Marcus, supra n. 11, at 329 (quoting
Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 217 n.6 (1945)).
93
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1938) (amended 1948). Rule 26 read, in pertinent part,
(a) When Depositions May be Taken. By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property which is the subject of the action or without such
leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any
person, whether a party or not, may be taken at the instance of
any party by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for use as
evidence in the action or for both purposes. The attendance of
witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoena as
provided in Rule 45. Depositions shall be taken only in
accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person
confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on
such terms as the court prescribes.(b) Scope of Examination.
Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule
30(b) or (d), the deponent may be examined regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action, whether relating to the claim
or defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of
any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of relevant facts.
Id.
94
FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (1938) (amended 1948). Rule 33 provided,
Any party may serve upon any adverse party written
interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the
party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership
or association, by any officer thereof competent to testify in
its behalf. The interrogatories shall be answered separately
and fully in writing under oath. The answers shall be signed
by the person making them; and the party upon whom the
interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the
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Though these rules made exceptions for privileged materials,96
meaning documents revealing attorney-client communications
would remain protected under the attorney-client privilege, the
rules made no exception for documents prepared in the course of
preparing for litigation. In the absence of a rule on point, courts
answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within 15
days after the delivery of the interrogatories, unless the court,
on motion and notice and for good cause shown, enlarges or
shortens the time. Objections to any interrogatories may be
presented to the court within 10 days after service thereof,
with notice as in case of a motion; and answers shall be
deferred until the objections are determined, which shall be at
as early a time as is practicable. No party may, without leave
of court, serve more than one set of interrogatories to be
answered by the same party.
Id.
95
FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1938) (amended 1948). Rule 34 provided,
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and
upon notice to all other parties, the court in which an action is
pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of
the moving party, of any designated documents, papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in
his possession, custody, or control; or (2) order any party to
permit entry upon designated land or other property in his
possession or control for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order
shall specify the time, place, and manner of making the
inspection and taking the copies and photographs and may
prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
Id.
96
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (“…the deponent may be examined regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action…”) (emphasis added); FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (“the court…may (1)
order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody, or
control…”) (emphasis added).
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soon began to adopt a variety of approaches on how to deal with
such materials.
Though the “work product” problem was not the only
troublesome issue faced by the first rules, it was certainly one of
the most controversial and the Advisory Committee to the Federal
Rules soon began to explore language to address the issue.97
Courts dealing with objections to the production of such materials
generally fell into one of two camps. Some courts held that such
materials must be produced, regardless of whether they were
produced by an attorney or by a third party employed by the party
claiming protection.98 The Advisory Committee noted that a
number of cases, however, had protected such materials from
discovery, though the reasons were hardly uniform.99 As the
Committee noted,
Thus it has been held by some courts that
statements obtained from witnesses, parties or
others are not material as evidence, or are hearsay
and inadmissible, and discovery has been denied. . .
. Some courts have also emphasized what they
thought to be the unfairness of letting the other

97

Marcus, supra n. 11, at 329; Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 354-55
(1946).
98
Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Blank v. Great Northern
Ry. Co., 4 F.R.D. 213 (D.Minn. 1943); In re Matter of The Examination of
Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, 3 F.R.D. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Revheim v.
Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., 2 F.R.D. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Seligson v.
Camp Westover, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Matthies v. Peter F.
Connolly Co., 2 F.R.D. 277 (E.D.N.Y .1941); Colpak v. Hetterick, 40 F.Supp.
350 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Kane v. News Syndicate Co., Inc., 1 F.R.D. 738
(S.D.N.Y. 1941); Price v. Levitt, 29 F.Supp. 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); Bough v.
Lee, 29 F.Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Kulich v. Murray, 28 F.Supp. 675
(S.D.N.Y. 1939); Bough v. Lee, 28 F.Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). See also
Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 457 (1946) (listing above cases as
supporting discovery of work product materials); Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d
212, n.8 (3d Cir. 1946) (summarizing cases where discovery was permitted).
99
Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 457-59 (1946).
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party, through discovery, obtain free of charge the
material gathered or prepared by his adversary; that
to permit such a course would penalize diligence
and put a premium on laziness; and that discovery
should not constitute a “fishing expedition.”. . .
Some courts have held that it is improper to seek
any evidentiary matter gathered by or for the
adversary party after commencement of the action.
. . . And a number of cases, as to particular matters
to be discovered, have either denied the discovery
because no reason or cause therefor was shown
regarding the data sought, or denied discovery on
the general principle that no inquiry should be
made into the adversary's preparation of his case
for trial.100
Thus courts were split as to what to do with material generated
when litigation was pending. It was within this context that the
Hickman case was decided.
B. Hickman v. Taylor at the trial and appellate level
On February 6, 1943 a tug boat named the J.M. Taylor,
owned by the partnership of Taylor & Anderson, capsized killing
five of the seamen on board including Norman Hickman.101 Soon
after the accident, Taylor & Anderson hired an attorney, Mr.
Fortenbaugh, to defend the partnership in any subsequent suit that
might arise in connection with the sinking of the J.M.Taylor.102
On March 4, 1943, a steamboat inspector’s hearing was held
where the four surviving members of the crew testified and
immediately after the hearing, Fortenbaugh interviewed these
witnesses himself and obtained written statements from them.103
Fortenbaugh also interviewed other relevant witnesses “and in

100

Id. at 458-59 (internal citations omitted).
Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 480-81; Marcus, supra n. 11, at 332-33
102
Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 481; Marcus, supra n. 11, at 333.
103
Id.

101
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some cases made memoranda of what they told him.”104
Thereafter, settlements were reached with representatives of three
of the five dead seamen.105
On November 26, 1943, Hickman’s father, as administrator
of his son’s estate brought suit against Taylor & Anderson under
the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, alleging his son’s death resulted
from Taylor & Anderson’s negligence.106 Pursuant to Rule 33, the
plaintiff requested that Taylor & Anderson produce copies of any
statements made by members of the crew taken after the
accident.107 Taylor & Anderson refused claiming that the
interrogatory called for “‘privileged matter obtained in preparation
of litigation.’”108 The district court subsequently held a hearing
where Fortenbaugh testified by deposition on how and why the
statements were made.109
In defending its refusal to produce the statements, the
defendants cited to Stark v. American Dredging Co.,110 where the
district court denied production of statements of witnesses made in
preparation for trial.111 Judge Kirkpatrick, sitting with an en banc
panel of the entire Eastern District, refused to recognize a broad
104

Id.
Id.
106
Id. at 480; Marcus, supra n. 11, at 334. Curiously, the district court referred
to Hickman as the plaintiff’s wife, which Richard Marcus points out is
incorrect. Marcus, supra n. 11, at 334, n.43. As Marcus also points out, suit
was also filed against Baltimore & Ohio Railroad (“B&O”). Id. at 332. B&O
were the owners of a sunken car float which the J.M. Taylor had been hired to
tow across the Delaware River the night of the accident. Id.
107
Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 480. The interrogatory read,
‘State whether any statements of the members of the crews of
the Tugs ‘J. M. Taylor’ and ‘Philadelphia’ or of any other
vessel were taken in connection with the towing of the car
float and the sinking of the Tug ‘John M. Taylor.’ Attach
hereto exact copies of all such statements if in writing, and if
oral, set forth in detail the exact provisions of any such oral
statements or reports.'
Id. (quoting interrogatory #38).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
3 F.R.D. 300, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
111
Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 481-82.
105
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sweeping protection from discovery of all things produced in
anticipation of litigation.112 In doing so the court first noted the
liberal scope of discovery under the Rules, stating “[t]he guiding
principle is the broad conception of the Rules that discovery of all
matters relevant to a suit should be allowed to the fullest extent
consistent with the orderly and efficient functioning of the judicial
process.”113 The court then went on to distinguish the Stark
decision as simply recognizing that the Rules granted the court
discretion to limit production but then disapproved Stark in that it
placed a burden on the party seeking production to show “good
cause.”114 The court then reformulated the rule as “[u]nless, under
the circumstances of any particular case, the Court is satisfied that
the administration of justice will be in some way impeded,
discovery will be granted when asked.”115
Turning to the statements at issue, the court first noted that
any firm would conduct an investigation to determine its own
ship’s seaworthiness and whether its employees were
responsible.116 Though the court did not state so expressly, it
appears that the court was implying that business concerns could
have driven the investigation. Whether the statements were
prepared in anticipation of litigation or not, the court nonetheless
felt that they should be produced. Though the court noted that it
could not compel production of materials within the traditional
boundaries of the attorney-client privilege, it found that the
statements to Fortenbaugh were not covered by this privilege.117
Without the protection of this privilege, the court found that the

112

Id. at 481-82 (“We do not regard that [Stark] decision as laying down a hard
and fast rule that statements obtained for [preparation for trial] are privileged, or
exempt from production for any other reason.”).
113
Id. at 481.
114
Id. at 482.
115
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
116
Id.
117
Id. The court gives little explanation on this point but it is worth noting that
status of the attorney-client privilege as it related to businesses was very much a
matter of debate until the Supreme Court case of Upjohn. Under the Upjohn
formulation of the rule, it is very possible that the statements made to
Fortenbaugh would be privileged. See part II.B.1., n.46, supra.
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statements should be produced under the broad scope of discovery
under the Rules.118 Interestingly, the court did place an important
limit on this discovery; the court limited discovery of
Fortenbaugh’s “mental impressions, opinions, legal theories and
other collateral matter” and held that the court should review the
produced materials and only produce those portions “containing
facts obtained from witnesses which it considers to be within the
proper scope of discovery.”119 The court thus ordered production
of the witness statements to the court for such a determination to
be made.120 Taylor & Anderson and Fortenbaugh refused to
produce the statements and were found in contempt of court by the
assigned judge.121
The district court’s ruling was appealed to the Third
Circuit and was heard en banc.122 As an initial matter, the
appellate court noted that the promulgation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure had indeed introduced a sea change in the way
discovery was to be conducted.123 The court summarized,
We must discard, for instance, the concept that
there is something close to a property right in the
information which the lawyer digs up about the
client's case and has in his possession. We must
also discard the notion that questions from the other
side can be fended off on the ground that the
opponent's lawyer is simply engaged in a fishing
expedition. These notions are hard to get rid of, but
we take it that they are contrary to the idea of this
discovery portion of the Federal Rules.124
118

Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 482.
Id. at 483.
120
Id.
121
Marcus, supra n. 11, at 336; Hickman, 153 F.2d at 214. This actually created
a desirable result for the defendants as the order to produce the statements,
which normally would not be eligible for interlocutory appeal, was now
immediately reviewable. Marcus, supra n. 11, at 336; Hickman, 153 F.2d at
214.
122
Hickman, 153 F.2d at 214.
123
Id. at 216-17.
124
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).

119
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But despite the broad purpose of the Rules in facilitating the
discovery process, the appellate court expressed concern over the
unfettered production of materials which might impinge upon the
attorney-client relationship.125 Of particular concern was the
possibility that an attorney could be called as a witness in the same
case in which he was acting as an advocate to verify the content of
a witness statement.126 Though such a situation was frowned upon
by the Canons of Ethics, the appellate court noted that the Rules’
“privilege” exceptions (which prevented the discovery of
privileged material) did not cover the statements at hand as the
statements were made by third parties and not by clients.127
District courts addressing the issue had split as to how to handle
the production of such materials, leaving the Third Circuit with no
clear direction.128 Nonetheless, the court held that “intangible
things, the results of the lawyer’s use of his tongue, his pen, and
his head, for his client,” material which the court termed “work
product of the lawyer,” were covered by the exception to
privileged material under the Rules.129 The Third Circuit justified
this extension of the term “privileged” on public policy grounds,
stating,
Those members of the public who have matters to
be settled through lawyers and through litigation
should be free to make full disclosure to their
advisers and to have those advisers and other
persons concerned in the litigation free to put their
whole-souled efforts into the business while it is
carried on.130
125

Id. at 219-220.
Id.
127
Id. at 220 and 222. As noted above, the statements from Taylor &
Anderson’s employees could arguably be privileged under a modern
construction of the attorney-client privilege. See supra n. 117.
128
Id. at 220. The appellate court, in a lengthy footnote, summarized the
varying decisions and their reasoning. Id. at n.13.
129
Id. at 223.
130
Id. (internal footnotes omitted) (citing Wigmore (3d ed.) § 2291 (advocating
that the policy of the attorney client privilege necessarily involves full
disclosure; “[i]n order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by
126
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C. Development of The “Work Product” Doctrine by the
Advisory Committee and under Hickman v. Taylor
While Hickman was working its way through the court
system, the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules was busy
attempting to reach a resolution via rule-making to the “work
product” problem.131 At first, the Committee adopted an approach
that seemed much more in line with those cases holding that broad
discovery should be allowed into trial preparation materials.132 In
its first preliminary draft of amendments to the Rules, proposed in
1944, the Committee’s solution was to amend Rule 30(b) to
provide for protective orders against discovery “into papers and
documents prepared or obtained by the adverse party in the
preparation of the case for trial.”133 The burden, however, of
seeking the protective order was on the adverse party that was
resisting the discovery request.134 One year later, the Advisory
Committee proposed a second draft keeping the protective order
approach to “work product” materials but with a more expansive
explanatory note.135 The note explained that the purpose of the
rule was to make clear that discovery of materials prepared in
anticipation of litigation was permitted and that such materials
were not privileged, but that the district courts would retain
clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisors must be
removed; and hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client’s
consent.”)).
131
Anderson et al., supra n. 7, at 771-72.
132
Marcus, supra n. 11, at 330.
133
Advisory Committee on Rules For Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States 43 (1944); Marcus, supra n.11, at 330; Anderson, supra n.6, at
772.
134
Advisory Committee on Rules For Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States 43 (1944); Marcus, supra n.11, at 330.
135
Advisory Committee on Rules For Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States 38-40 (1945); Marcus, supra n.11, at 331; Anderson, supra n.7, at
772.
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discretion to deny discovery into such materials via the protective
order.136 However, as district courts were already divergent in
their approaches on how to handle such materials, the lack of
direction on how to exercise discretion as to whether to issue a
protective order would lead to confusion; a fact recognized by the
Committee without resolution at that time.137
In 1946, the Committee, possibly in response to the
vigorous debate that centered around the treatment of trial
preparation material, changed its proposed amendment on how to
treat such material.138 The new proposal amending Rule 30, which
was very similar to the language contained in today’s Rule
26(b)(3), read,
The court shall not order the production or
inspection of any writing obtained or prepared by
the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor,
or agent in anticipation of litigation or in
preparation for trial unless satisfied that denial of
production or inspection will unfairly prejudice the
party seeking the production or inspection in
preparing his claim or defense or will cause him
undue hardship or injustice. The court shall not
order the production or inspection of any part of the
writing that reflects an attorney's mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal

136

Advisory Committee on Rules For Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States 38-40 (1945); Marcus, supra n.11, at 331; Anderson, supra n.7, at
772.
137
Advisory Committee on Rules For Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States 39-40 (1945); Anderson, supra n.7, at 772.
138
Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 356 (1946) (“There is no
Amendment about which there is a greater or stronger division of opinion
among members of the Bar.”).
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theories, or, except as provided in Rule 35, the
conclusions of an expert.139
This amendment was put forth without the opportunity for
comment from the bar,140 but that is not to say that the Committee
was without a clear understanding of the conflicting views on how
trial preparation materials should be treated.141 Indeed, at a 1946
symposium on discovery procedures held before the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals (the same circuit from which Hickman came),
George Wharton Pepper, the vice-chairman of the Advisory
Committee, noted that the amendment the Committee arrived upon
was the result of debate between those who favored complete
discovery and those who favored complete exclusion of trial
preparation materials.142 As Mr. Pepper stated, “It seems to me,
looking at the things as clearly as I can, that what the Committee
has attempted comes about as near as possible to steering a middle
course between two extreme views neither of which would give
anything like general satisfaction to the bar.”143 How the
Committee came upon the exact language used is also not entirely
clear, though it was surely influenced by the district court
decisions denying discovery based on good cause,144 as well as the
139

Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 456-57 (1946); Report of the
Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Recommending
Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 356 (1946).
140
Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 340 and 356 (1946).
141
See, e.g., Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 356 (1946) (“[The
Amendment] may be that this is the best that can be done if a position is to be
taken between complete exclusion and complete discovery.”).
142
Symposium, Discovery Procedure, 5 F.R.D. at 406-07. This symposium
demonstrates the heated debate between the opposing views amongst the Bar.
Among the speakers were Samuel Fortenbaugh, the attorney from Hickman
(which at the time of the symposium was on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court), advocating in favor of exclusion, id. at 408, and Mr. Abraham
Freedman, who advocated in favor of discovery. Id. at 418-26.
143
Id. at 407.
144
See Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 458-59 (1946) (noting that a
number of cases had denied discovery “because no reason or cause therefor was
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145

Hickman decisions themselves.
The language in the
amendment may also have been influenced by English law which
did not permit the discovery of trial preparation materials.146
Regardless of how it struck the balance in its proposal, the
Committee had come to what it felt was a fair compromise and the
decision was now left to the Supreme Court whether to either
adopt the rule or deal with the problem through judicial decisionmaking via the Hickman case, which was on appeal before the
Supreme Court.147 The Court apparently chose the latter.148
The Supreme Court granted certiorari based upon the divergence
of views in the district courts on how to deal with trial preparation

shown regarding the data sought, or denied discovery on the general principle
that no inquiry should be made into the adversary's preparation of his case for
trial” and listing the cases).
145
Id. at 459-60 (discussing Hickman). In fact, the Committee expressed its
doubts as to the result in the Third Circuit’s decision in Hickman, as the
Committee believed that the term “privileged,” which the Circuit Court found to
encompass trial preparation materials, was not intended to be used so broadly.
Id. at 460 (“The Committee believes that the term ‘privileged’ as used in that
rule was not designed to include anything more than that embraced within the
rule of testimonial exclusion regarding privileged communications as developed
under the applicable laws of evidence, both common-law and statutory.”);
Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 356 (1946).
146
Symposium, Discovery Procedure, 5 F.R.D. at 414-418 (1946) (statements of
Mr. Thomas E. Byrne and Mr. Harrison G. Kildare, both of the Philadelphia
Bar, reciting English law excluding trial preparation documents). Mr. Kildare
noted that the “The time-tested English rule is embodied in effect in the first
part of the proposed Addition to Rule 30(b), as follows: ‘The court shall not
order the production or inspection of any writing obtained or prepared by the
adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of
litigation or in preparation for trial ***’” but criticized the qualification
permitting the judge the discretion to allow discovery. Id. at 418.
147
Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 459-60 (1946); Marcus, supra n.11,
at 331.
148
Marcus, supra n. 11, at 338; Advisory Committee’s Explanatory Statement
Concerning Amendments of the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499 (1969)
(“In deciding the Hickman case, the Supreme Court appears to have expressed a
preference in 1947 for an approach to the problem of trial preparation materials
by judicial decision rather than by rule.”).
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materials and noted the Advisory Committee’s Report on the
problem.149 After initially dealing with the procedural irregularity
of how the case came before it,150 the court turned to the merits by
first noting, as had the district and appellate courts, that in keeping
with the purpose of their promulgation, the discovery rules were to
be read liberally.151 The Court noted, however, that discovery was
not without limits, and that privileged materials would not be
subject to discovery.152 But, the Court found that the materials at
issue before them, the witness statements and Fortenbaugh’s
recollections of those interviews, were not protected by the
attorney-client privilege and that the word “privilege,” as used in
the Rules, did not extend to material produced in anticipation of
litigation.153 The court held,
We also agree that the memoranda, statements and
mental impressions in issue in this case fall outside
the scope of the attorney-client privilege and hence
are not protected from discovery on that basis. It is
unnecessary here to delineate the content and scope
of that privilege as recognized in the federal courts.
For present purposes, it suffices to note that the
protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to
information which an attorney secures from a
witness while acting for his client in anticipation of
litigation. Nor does this privilege concern the
memoranda, briefs, communications and other
writings prepared by counsel for his own use in
prosecuting his client's case; and it is equally
unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's
149

Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500 and n.1.
There was some question as to whether the case was even properly before the
Court as the plaintiff had not properly attempted to depose Fortenbough under
Rule 26, but the Court chose to move forward with the case rather than force the
plaintiff to go through the empty formality of pursuing the correct procedural
device. Id. at 504-05.
151
Id. at 507 (“Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation.”).
152
Id. at 508.
153
Id.
150
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mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal
theories.154
Thus, as the Third Circuit had found the materials to be
“privileged,” the Supreme Court had overruled the Third Circuit
on this point.
Though the materials were not privileged, the Supreme
Court still found in favor of Taylor (and Fortenbaugh)155 based on
its concern over the plaintiff’s attempts to delve into the files of
the opposing attorney without any showing of necessity.156 The
Court noted that the plaintiff was able to obtain information from
the interrogatories and that nothing prevented the plaintiff from
interviewing the same witnesses Fortenbaugh had interviewed.157
The Court found this particularly disturbing because the plaintiff’s
justification for requesting the material was to “help prepare
himself to examine witnesses and to make sure that he has
overlooked nothing.”158 The Supreme Court thus created a new
rule that protected the “work product” of an attorney from
discovery unless the party seeking disclosure could prove
necessity and prejudice.159 The Court did not stop there, however,
and went on to make a distinction between what it termed “non-
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Id.
Id. at 514.
156
Id. at 508-09.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 513.
159
Id. at 509, 511-512;
We are thus dealing with an attempt to secure the production
of written statements and mental impressions contained in the
files and the mind of the attorney Fortenbaugh without any
showing of necessity or any indication or claim that denial of
such production would unduly prejudice the preparation of
petitioner's case or cause him any hardship or injustice.
Id. at 509. See also In re San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d
1007, 1014 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Hickman as the genesis of the “substantial
need/undue hardship standard”); Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir.
1985) (same). The Court defined work product as including that which was
reflected in “interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental
impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible
ways.” Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
155
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privileged facts” and production of “oral statements made by
witnesses to Fortenbaugh, whether presently in the form of his
mental impressions or memoranda,” which would, in today’s
parlance, most likely be deemed “core” work product.160 As to the
latter materials, the Court expressed its doubt as to whether any
showing of necessity could be made to justify production but
stopped short of giving such materials an unqualified immunity.161
Reflecting upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Hickman,
a few points are worth highlighting with regard to the scope and
policy behind the protection the court afforded an attorney’s
“work product.” First, much of the materials that were being
sought, and with which the Court was expressing concern over,
would be termed “core” work product in modern parlance. It also
bears pointing out that though the materials at issue in Hickman
were prepared in anticipation of litigation, the Court no where
made this a set requirement for the protection afforded. Indeed,
the Court, if it so chose, could have easily recognized this
requirement as it was before the Court as a proposed amendment
to the Rules, and yet chose instead to address the issue through the
Hickman decision which made no such qualification.162 In this
vein, the Court did not confine its reasoning to the litigation
context, but instead, in justifying the protection, described a
lawyer’s role in terms of “performing his various duties,”
protecting his “client’s interests” and “the giving of legal advice”
as well as speaking in terms of preparing the client’s case.163
Also, with regard to why the protection was necessary, the
Court appeared to offer multiple justifications. One was the most
commonly cited “zone of privacy” justification, where the Court
stated,

160

Id. at 511-12.
Id. at 512.
162
The Court did note that the English courts had developed a privilege covering
“documents prepared by or for counsel with a view to litigation.” Id. at 510,
n.9. However, though the Court noted this qualification in the English courts,
the Supreme Court did not make such a qualification in its own opinion.
163
Id. at 510-11.
161
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In performing his various duties, however, it is
essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree
of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by
opposing parties and their counsel. Proper
preparation of a client's case demands that he
assemble information, sift what he considers to be
the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his
legal theories and plan his strategy without undue
and needless interference. That is the historical and
the necessary way in which lawyers act within the
framework of our system of jurisprudence to
promote justice and to protect their clients'
interests.164
This justification is based on a balancing of the merits of having a
well-functioning adversarial system with open discovery. This
“adversarial” justification is apparent also in the Court’s concern
over plaintiff’s counsel’s admission that he only wanted to obtain
the materials in question to make sure he hadn’t missed
something; in other words, so he could reap the benefits of
Fortenbaugh’s insight and ability as a lawyer.165 This aligns with
the concerns articulated by the Advisory Committee about
achieving a proper balance between the two opposing views
(complete exclusion versus complete discovery) of how such
materials should be treated,166 but also seems to be a nod that to
allow the production of such materials “penalizes the diligent,”
and puts a “premium on laziness;” justifications that were
sometimes used by district courts to support denying production of
“work product” materials.167
A second justification, that is often overlooked, however,
is a concern over the effect on the legal profession itself and upon
164

Id.
Id. at 513.
166
Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 356 (1946).
167
Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 458, 460 (1946). The Advisory
Committee, in formulating its proposed amendment, rejected these as tests for
whether production should be denied. Id. at 460.
165
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the attorney-client relationship. After articulating the adversarial
justification for the protection, the Court went on to state,
Were such materials open to opposing counsel on
mere demand, much of what is now put down in
writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's
thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his
own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices
would inevitably develop in the giving of legal
advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The
effect on the legal profession would be
demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and
the cause of justice would be poorly served.168
These considerations, which again seem to speak particularly to
“core” work product, bear much in common with the instrumental
policy justifications for having the attorney-client privilege.169
The reference to not writing down a thought or fact for fear of
discovery reflects a concern that the interests of a client would be
negatively affected. In his concurrence, Justice Jackson points out
a further instrumental concern that production of such material
could have the undesirable effect of forcing attorneys to take the
witness stand in the case in which they are an advocate;170 a
concern that also is mirrored in the policies underlying the
attorney-client privilege.
IV.Post Hickman Development of the Work Product Doctrine
A.The road to rule 26(b)(3) and the anticipation
misconception

168

Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege serves
the function of promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and
their clients. It thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the
administration of justice.”); Guy v. United HealthCare Corp., 154 F.R.D. 172,
177 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (quoting Weintraub); Marks, supra n. 47, at 157.
170
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 517 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
169
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Though the “anticipation of litigation” requirement was not
articulated in the Hickman decision itself, the requirement soon
found its way into district court opinions. The case of Rediker v.
Warfield,171 a 1951 District of New York opinion appears to be
one of the earliest articulations of this requirement. In Rediker,
the plaintiff, an attorney, brought suit against Warfield and Scott,
who were also attorneys, and also against the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development for allegedly interfering with
a contract the plaintiff had with Ulen Realization Corporation to
collect a claim from the Government of Iran.172 The plaintiff
issued interrogatories regarding communications Warfield and
Scott, as legal counsel for Ulen, had with International Bank.173
Warfield and Scott resisted, in part, on the basis that the
interrogatories would delve into material protected under the
work-product doctrine.174 The court, citing to little more than the
Hickman decision, denied affording work product protection,
noting that the communications at issue “were not in the course of
preparation for trial [nor] does it appear that they were in
anticipation of prospective litigation.”175 The court went on to
distinguish the case before it from Hickman on the basis that in
Rediker, the attorneys were also the defendants.176 The court,
however, gave little explanation as to why it was asserting an
anticipation of litigation requirement other than its broad citation
to Hickman.
Despite its lack of explanation, the Harvard Law Review,
in a 1961 student written survey of developments in discovery
law, cited to the Rediker case (and only the Rediker case) to
support the assertion that “[a]lthough work-product protection is
not limited to material gathered after commencement of an action,
it has been held to apply only when material is obtained in

171

11 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
Id. at 126-27.
173
Id. at 127-28.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 128.
176
Id.
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177

anticipation of litigation.”
The Developments Note went on to
justify the requirement, claiming,
Since a lawyer who does not envision litigation will
not anticipate discovery requests, the fear of
disclosure should not affect the way in which the
material is prepared. For example, if the owner of
real property employs an attorney to investigate the
marketability of his title preparatory to offering it
for sale, it seems that the fruits of the lawyer’s
search should be fully discoverable if litigation
relating to a subsequent sale contract should
eventuate. In such circumstances, as in all those in
which a lawyer is asked to assist in planning future
conduct, even though he might recognize the ever
present possibility of litigation, he is prompted
chiefly by his responsibility to avoid embroiling his
client in controversy.178
This reasoning, however, is flawed. At best the justification is
naïve as to the nature of the work of an attorney and at worst it is
circular. The reasoning is naïve in that it assumes that an attorney
who is doing his or her job will not fear discovery of work product
because the work product was produced to avoid litigation rather
than to engage in litigation. Yet, the very same material that was
used to avoid litigation could just as easily assist an opponent in
litigation as notes made in preparation for litigation.179 Indeed, the
reasoning seems to ignore the Supreme Courts admonition that
“[w]ere such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand,
much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten.
. . .The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And
the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly
served.”180

177

Developments in the Law – Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 1030 (1960-61)
[hereinafter “Developments Note”] (emphasis added) (citing to the Rediker
opinion as its only support for the statement).
178
Id.
179
Anderson, supra n. 7, at 788, n.175.
180
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
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The reasoning could also be viewed as circular in that it
seems to assume that an attorney who does his or her job will not
end up in litigation and so there should be no fear of discovery.
But for an attorney to best complete the tasks assigned by the
client, the attorney must feel free to make notes and create work
product without fear of discovery. Thus, for attorneys to do their
job, they must work without fear of discovery, which can only be
done if they are doing their job. The break-down of this reasoning
may stem from what Professor Kirst identifies as a fundamental
misreading of Hickman.
The logic of the Developments Note is flawed at a
fundamental level, because it depends on
combining two ideas the Supreme Court had
carefully separated in Hickman – whether the
information is discoverable and whether the
information can be discovered from the lawyer’s
materials. In Hickman the Court stressed that the
information was routinely discoverable as a matter
of course from the client. The work product
doctrine of Hickman was a limitation on routinely
discovering the information from the lawyer’s
materials.181
Despite the fact that the Developments Note cites to no
case to support its reasoning, it was cited the very next year in
Colton v. United States182 by the Second Circuit which, based on
the note and the Rediker opinion, held that for work product
protection to apply, the materials must be produced in anticipation
of litigation.183 In Colton, Edward Colton was an attorney
engaged by Herbert and Mercedes Matters to assist them with their
taxes. The Matters were subsequently investigated by the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) and Colton was issued a summons by the
IRS to testify and to produce “copies of income tax returns,
workpapers, correspondence files, memoranda and all other data
relating to the preparation and the filing of Federal Income Tax
181

Kirst, supra n.66, at 274.
306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962).
183
Id. at 640.
182
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184

Returns for or on the behalf of [the Matters].”
At an initial
interview in response to the summons, Colton gave little
information and refused to hand over documents claiming
protection under the attorney-client privilege.185 Eventually,
Colton agreed to answer some questions but still refused to answer
others or hand over materials based upon the privilege.186 The
court considered first the claim of attorney-client privilege and
held that it did not protect many of the communications that
pertained merely to the time period of representation and other
matters that did not reflect legal advice.187 The court then turned
to the documents which Colton claimed were protected as work
product under Hickman. Citing simply to Rediker and the
Developments Note, the court held that such materials must be
shown to be “collected or prepared in anticipation of litigation, . . .
to justify invocation of this rule.”188
Though the Second Circuit adopted “anticipation of
litigation” as a threshold requirement, no other circuit courts
appear to have adopted this standard prior to 1970, when the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to explicitly
incorporate the work product doctrine, and the “anticipation of
litigation” requirement into Rule 26(b)(3). However, at least one
circuit did recognize that “anticipation of litigation” was not a
formal requirement under Hickman. In Natta v. Hogan,189 a
number of parties, including Phillips Petroleum Company,
challenged the priority date of a patent held by Montecatini.190
Montecatini sought to discover documents which Phillips claimed
were protected under the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine.191 The trial court denied protection under the
work product doctrine as the documents were not prepared for

184

Id. at 634.
Id. at 635.
186
Id, at 636.
187
Id. at 637-38.
188
Id. at 640.
189
392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968).
190
Id. at 688.
191
Id. at 691, 693.
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192

possible litigation.
The Tenth Circuit rejected the trial court’s
premise that litigation was an essential element of work product
protection stating,
Nothing in Hickman v. Taylor suggests that the
work product rule is limited to preparation for
proceedings in a court of record. The rationale for
the work product doctrine is the prevention of
unnecessary interference with the work of an
attorney. An attorney's work in the patent law field
should be as much his own as it is in other areas of
the law. The work product claim cannot be brushed
aside on the theory that the documents were not
prepared for use in litigation.193
The court went on to hold that though many of the tests and
experiments that were conducted in connection with the patent
application would be discoverable, the hand-written notes of
attorneys were not, finding that “such materials prepared by an
attorney during his consideration of a legal problem are within the
work product doctrine.”194
Though the Tenth Circuit appeared to approve of a
standard for work product that took into account whether the
material reflected an attorney’s consideration of a legal problem
regardless of whether it was in “anticipation of litigation,” it could
also be read to have simply not constrained work product to
“proceedings in a court of record.”195 In other words, Natta may
have done nothing more but expand work product to other
adversarial proceedings. The tone and wording of its
interpretation seem to suggest otherwise, but in subsequent cases,
such as the previously discussed Hercules opinion, courts
distinguished Natta on the basis that it involved an interference
proceeding, which was adversarial, and not simply the prosecution
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Id. at 693.
Id.
194
Id. at 693-94 (citing Hickman). Of the four hand written documents the court
considered, it only extended protection to one as the others were not identified
as being written by any particular attorney. Id. at 694.
195
Id. at 693.
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196

of a patent.
If the Natta decision did create a circuit split, it
seems to have gone unnoticed and the origin of the “anticipation
of litigation” standard has not been questioned by the courts.
Indeed, by the time the Advisory Committee on the
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was ready to
re-examine the work product doctrine, it was not due to
disagreement over the “anticipation of litigation” requirement but
rather over whose work product was protected and the scope of
Rule 34, which subjected discovery to a “good cause”
requirement197 and how this applied, if at all, to the work product
doctrine.198 Though the Advisory Committee had made some

196

Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 151-52 (D.C. Del. 1977
(citing In re Natta, 48 F.R.D. 319, 321 (D. Del. 1969)).
197
Rule 34 read, in relevant part:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and
upon notice to all other parties, . . . the court in which an
action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on
behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope of the
examination permitted by Rule 26(b) and which are in his
possession, custody, or control . . ..
FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1968) (amended 1970).
198
In developing a new rule to clarify the work product doctrine, the Advisory
Committee recognized the problems that had arisen regarding the coverage of
the work product doctrine stating,
The major difficulties visible in the existing case law are (1)
confusion and disagreement as to whether “good cause” is
made out by a showing of relevance and lack of privilege, or
requires an additional showing of necessity, (2) confusion and
disagreement as to the scope of the Hickman work-product
doctrine, particularly whether it extends beyond work actually
performed by lawyers, and (3) the resulting difficulty of
relating the “good cause” required by Rule 34 and the
“necessity or justification” of the work-product doctrine, so
that their respective roles and the distinctions between them
are understood.
Advisory Committee’s Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of the
Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499-500 (1969).
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failed efforts in the 1950s to address the issues raised by
Hickman,199 it was not until 1967 that the amendments that led to
the current rule began to develop. An initial draft of the
Committee’s amendment attempted to solve the recognized
problems, in part, by making clear that work product protection
extended beyond simply the work of the attorney.200 But
curiously, the Committee’s solution to the “good cause” problem
was to simply lump all work product together and subject it to the
same standard – a “good cause” standard.201 The amendment read,
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the
provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party
may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or by or for that other
party's representative (including his attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)
only upon a showing of good cause therefor, except
that a statement concerning the action or its subject
matter previously given by the party seeking the
statement may be obtained without such a
showing.202
This solution was odd in that it seemingly ignored the Supreme
Court’s statement in Hickman that such materials could only be
discovered upon a showing of necessity and prejudice.203
Furthermore, the one-size-fits-all approach to work product
materials failed to recognize the special protection that the
Hickman Court recognized should be afforded to an attorney’s
“core” work product.204 As one critic of the rule recognized,
199

Anderson, supra n. 7, at 782-83 (noting that the amendments were rejected).
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure
Relating to Deposition and Discovery (Nov. 1967), 43 F.R.D. 211, 225 (1968).
201
Id.
202
Id. It is perhaps worth noting that the 1946 Amendment also contained an
“anticipation of litigation” requirement, which may have simply been carried
forward when it became time to amend the Rules. See part III.C., supra.
203
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 509, 511-12; Address by Fred A. Freund, Changes
Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 494 (1968).
204
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12.
200
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“[t]he source of error . . . is in formulating flexible language to
cover all such materials, rather than dealing directly and
specifically with what experience has taught – that certain
materials deserve more protection than others.”205
In response to criticisms that the “good cause” standard
would create confusion based on the various meanings the term
had been given by courts, the Advisory Committee altered the
standard in Rule 26(b) to reflect the trend in case law to require
“more than mere relevance.”206 Thus, in keeping with the factors
stated in Hickman as to when trial preparation material could be
discovered, the Committee added that such material could only be
discovered “upon a showing of substantial need of the materials in
the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means.”207 The Committee also added language to protect
the “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories
concerning the litigation of an attorney or other representative of a
party.” In doing so, the Committee cited again to Hickman,
however, the Committee failed to clarify the extent of such
protection.208 The final language also failed to provide guidance
as to the meaning of the term “anticipation of litigation.”209 This
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Address by Fred A. Freund, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45
F.R.D. 479, 494 (1968) (emphasis in original).
206
Advisory Committee’s Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of
the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 500; Minutes of the July 17-19, 1969
Meeting of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure p. 3,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm .
207
Advisory Committee’s Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of
the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 494, 501 (1969).
208
It was noted in the meeting minutes of the Standing Committee that a
question regarding this provision was raised, though it is unclear whether the
question was with regard to the scope of the protection or some other matter.
Minutes of the July 17-19, 1969 Meeting of the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure p. 3, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm .
209
See FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 25 (1983) (noting that “Rule 26(b)(3)
does not address in so many words the temporal scope of the work product
immunity and a review of the Advisory Committee’s comments reveals no
express concern for that issue.”).
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term, as previously discussed, has led to splits among district and
appellate courts as to its meaning.210 Furthermore, a review of the
documents explaining the Committee’s reasoning regarding the
amendments reveals that the work product doctrine was often
simply assumed to be relevant only when in “anticipation of
litigation,” but no discussion of the standard or why such a
limitation should apply also to “core” work product appears.211
B. The Supreme Court’s interpretations of the work
product doctrine
The Supreme Court has seldom discussed the scope or
limits of the work product doctrine since passage of amended Rule
26 other than fleeting mentions of the Rule. There are, however,
at least three post-amendment opinions that merit discussion:
United States v. Nobles,212 FTC v. Grolier, Inc.,213 and Upjohn Co.
v. United States.214 The first two add some insight into the Court’s
210

See part II.A.1., supra.
See, e.g., Advisory Committee’s Explanatory Statement Concerning
Amendments of the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499-500 (noting the major
difficulties with existing law but omitting any mention of “core” work
product); Minutes of the May 20-21, 1966 Meeting of the Advisory Committee
on Civil pp. 30-31, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm.
The following excerpt is an example of the assumption that “core” work
product is only an issue when litigation is pending:
Mr. Acheson: I thought Mr. Jenner was merely talking about
preparation in anticipation of trial and he said a lot of this is
done before there is any trial at all.
Mr. Jenner: Yes, there would be no counsel at that particular
point.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Minutes of the July 17-19, 1969 Meeting of the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure p. 3, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm; Minutes of the March 9-10, 1967
Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil pp. 6-7, 11-12, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm.
212
422 U.S. 225 (1975).
213
462 U.S. 19 (1983).
214
449 U.S. 383 (1981). Professor Roger Kirst also discusses these three cases
in his article which advocates for expanded protection for the work of the
transactional attorney. See Kirst, supra n.66, at 268-73.
211
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view of the doctrine, however it is the Upjohn decision that is the
most instructive, both in the language used by the Court and also
by the way in which it deals with “core” work product.
In Nobles, a defendant accused of armed robbery sought to
impeach the prosecution’s two key eye-witnesses through
statements they had previously made to a defense investigator.215
The statements were written down by the investigator and made
part of a written report.216 The prosecution sought to inspect the
report and the court denied the request.217 However, the court told
defense counsel that if the investigator were called to the stand to
testify by the defense, the court would order production of those
portions of the report relevant to the impeachment.218 Defense
counsel later did seek to call the investigator for purposes of
impeachment but refused to share the report and so the court ruled
that the investigator could not testify.219 The Ninth Circuit
reversed finding that compelling discovery of the report violated
both the Fifth Amendment as well as Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16 (the criminal analog to the Federal Rule 26(b)).220
The Supreme Court reversed finding that neither the Fifth
Amendment nor Rule 16 were implicated.221 The Court
considered implication of the work product doctrine under
Hickman separately from Rule 16 and held that the defendant had
waived its protection when he sought to introduce the testimony of
the investigator.222
The Court’s discussion of the work product doctrine, at
first glance, appears rather unremarkable as far as its impact on
civil litigation. However, there are at least two interesting aspects
of the opinion that are worth discussing. First, the Court felt
compelled to discuss the work product doctrine under Hickman
separate from application of Rule 16, thus recognizing that
215

United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 222, 227 (1975).
Id. at 227-28.
217
Id. at 228-29.
218
Id. at 229 and n.3.
219
Id. at 229.
220
Id. at 229-30.
221
Id. at 234-35.
222
Id. at 239-40.
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223

Hickman has continued validity apart from the rules.
Second,
the Court, in its discussion of Hickman, stated, “The [Hickman]
Court therefore recognized a qualified privilege for certain
materials prepared by an attorney ‘acting for his client in
anticipation of litigation.’”224 Some courts have taken this as an
endorsement that the work product doctrine only applies to
materials produced in “anticipation of litigation.”225 The Court’s
statement makes no such limitation, however, and could be read as
nothing more than a description of the context in which Hickman
was decided.226
The Grolier case involved a request by Grolier Inc. under
the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) for documents
generated by the Government during an investigation of a
subsidiary of Grolier which was subsequently dismissed.227 The
Commission for disclosure of documents denied the request
claiming they were exempt under Exemption 5 of FOIA, which

223

The Court was compelled to do so as it found that Rule 16 only applied to
pre-trial discovery but that Hickman applied to both pre-trial discovery and
discovery after trial has begun. Id. at 235, 238-39. This was the subject of
Justice White’s concurrence, as he took issue limiting a trial court’s discretion
on evidentiary matter under Hickman. Id. at 243 (White, J., concurring).
224
Id. at 237-38 (quoting Hickman). After making this statement, the Court
makes a string cite to, among other things, the Harvard student note discussed in
part IV.A., supra. Id. at 238.
225
See, e.g., In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 61 (7th
Cir. 1980) (failing to dispel the Government’s assertion that Nobles requires a
document be prepared in anticipation of litigation for work product protection);
Matter of Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 212-13 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding, on the work
product issue, that “[t]he limited work product immunity extends only to certain
materials prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation” and citing
generally to Nobles); In re Grand Jury Proceedings of June 16, 1981, 519 F.
Supp. 791, 793 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (“[T]he work product rule only applies to
documents prepared in ‘anticipation of litigation,’” citing Nobles, 422 U.S. at
238). See also Kirst, supra n. 66, at 272 and n.213. As Professor Kirst
correctly notes, these cases add the word “only” which is not found in the
Nobles statement. Id. at 272.
226
See Kirst, supra n. 66, at 272 (noting also that the statement was dictum in
that the Court’s decision rested upon waiver and not whether the report was
created in anticipation of litigation).
227
F.T.C. v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 21(1983).
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protected from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a
party other than an agency in litigation with the agency . . . .”228
The district court agreed that all of the documents were protected
under Exemption 5, some of which due to the work product
doctrine.229 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed finding that the work product doctrine only protected
documents in an existing or potentially existing related
litigation.230 Thus, the issue before the Supreme Court was not
one related to discussing whether “core” work product could be
protected in a non-litigation context, but rather whether Hickman
and Rule 26(b) allowed the work product doctrine to extend to
other subsequent disputes, even if unrelated to the original
litigation.231 The Court noted the lack of any clear guidance on
the issue of a temporal scope for the work product rule, but did
express its view that “the literal language of the Rule protects
materials prepared for any litigation or trial as long as they were
prepared by or for a party to the subsequent litigation.”232 Thus,
the Court would seem to have expanded the protection of the Rule,
but the authority of this precedent was weakened by the Court’s
decision to base its ruling on an independent construction of
Exemption 5 to FOIA.233 Though there is some inkling that the
Court favored a broader rather than narrower view of the work
product doctrine, the Grolier case does not answer the question of
whether “core” work product can enjoy protection when not
generated in “anticipation of litigation.”
The most instructive Supreme Court opinion to be issued
since the adoption of the 1970 amendment to Rule 26 is the
Upjohn opinion. Though Upjohn Company v. United States234 is
most often known for the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the

228

Id. at 22, n.3 (citing 5 U.S.C.§ 522(b)(5)).
Id.
230
Id. at 23.
231
Id. at 24-25.
232
Id. at 25.
233
Id. at 26; Kirst, supra n.66, at 272-73.
234
449 U.S. 283 (1981).
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scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context,235
the decision also is relevant in interpreting the work product
doctrine.236 In Upjohn, the petitioner, Upjohn Company,
maintained that questionnaires sent by its attorneys to Upjohn
employees were privileged.237 The questionnaires were part of an
internal investigation that began in January of 1976 to discover
whether subsidiaries had made payments directly to or to the
benefit of foreign government officials in order to secure
government business.238 Upjohn’s attorneys also interviewed the
recipients of the questionnaire and 33 other Upjohn officers or
employees as part of the investigation.239 The interview notes
were described by Upjohn’s in-house counsel as follows:
My notes would contain what I considered to be the
important questions, the substance of the responses
to them, my beliefs as to the importance of these,
my beliefs as to how they related to the inquiry, my
thoughts as to how they related to other questions.
In some instances they might even suggest other
questions that I would have to ask or things that I
needed to find elsewhere. They were more than just
a verbatim report of my conversation with the-a
report of my conversation in the interviews.240
In March of 1976, after the initial investigation was made,
Upjohn made a preliminary report to the Securities and Exchange
235

Id. at 386; Anthony B. Joyce, The Massachsetts Approach to the
Intersection of Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege and Open Government
Laws, 42 SUFFOLK L. REV. 957, n. 5 (2009); Marks, supra n.47, at 162; The
ABA Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, Report of the American Bar
Association’s Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 60 BUS. LAW 1029,
1035 (2005).
236
See Kirst, supra n.66, at 268-71 (discussing the relevance of Upjohn to the
work product doctrine).
237
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386-87(1981).
238
Id. at 386.
239
Id. at 387.
240
Upjohn v. United States, 1978 WL 1163, *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 23, 1978). It
should be noted that the in-house general counsel was also the vice president
and secretary of the company as well as a member of the board of directors. Id.
at *2.
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Commission (“SEC”) on its Form 8-K disclosing that Upjohn had
made questionable payments.241 Subsequently, the IRS issued a
summons demanding production of these materials.242 Upjohn
declined to produce the documents on the grounds that they were
protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and also
constituted the work product of an attorney prepared in
“anticipation of litigation.”243 The United States filed a petition to
enforce the summons in the Western District of Michigan, and
upon the recommendation of the Magistrate, the court ordered the
production of the disputed materials.244 With regard to the claims
of work product protection, the Magistrate expressed some doubt
as to whether the work product doctrine applied at all to a tax
summons, but even if it did, found that the Government had met
its burden of proving “substantial need” and an inability “without
undue hardship” to obtain the information by other means.245 The
Sixth Circuit upheld the Magistrate’s ruling with regard to the
work product doctrine, stating, in a footnote, that the work product
doctrine did not apply to an IRS summons and made no further
analysis on the topic.246
On appeal, the Supreme Court quickly dismissed the Sixth
Circuit’s notion that the work product doctrine did not apply to a
tax summons.247 As the Magistrate had premised his ruling on a
finding of “substantial need” and “undue hardship,” the Court
continued its analysis, citing to both Rule 26 and Hickman.248 The
Court began its analysis by quoting Hickman’s policy reasons for
establishing the work product doctrine, citing both the “zone of
privacy” language as well as the language deriding the effect
disclosure would have on the profession and the relationship with

241

Id.; Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386-87.
Id. at 387-88.
243
Id. at 388.
244
Id. at 387. The magistrate also concluded that Upjohn had waived the
attorney-client privilege, but the Sixth Circuit rejected this finding. Id.
245
Upjohn, 1978 WL 1163, at *11-13.
246
Upjohn v. United States, 600 F.2d 1223, 1227-28, n.13 (6th Cir. 1979).
247
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981).
248
Id. at 398-99.
242
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249

clients.
It then rejected the Government’s argument that, even
under Hickman, necessity could compel disclosure of “core” work
product. The Court did so by distinguishing between “ordinary”
work product and “core” work product, noting that the caveat to
disclosure in Hickman, “did not apply to ‘oral statements made by
witnesses ... whether presently in the form of [the attorney's]
mental impressions or memoranda.’”250 The Court recognized that
some courts, applying Hickman and Rule 26, had afforded
absolute immunity to such materials, a standard the Court was
unwilling to adopt or reject because it was sufficient to merely
remand on the basis that the Magistrate had applied the wrong
standard in requiring “substantial need” and “undue hardship.”251
The Upjohn opinion is instructive both for its semantics
and for how it treated the “core” work product at issue.
Semantically, it is instructive that the Court cited to both the
Hickman opinion as well as Rule 26 in explaining the work
product doctrine.252 The court also noted that Hickman’s policies
had been “substantially incorporated” into Rule 26; a recognition
that Hickman was not fully incorporated into the Rule.253 Indeed,
this is consistent with the view that Hickman does continue to
have validity in covering intangible work product , while Rule 26,
by its terms, only applies to tangible work product.254 It is also
worth noting that, in articulating the policies supporting the work
product doctrine, the court did not stop with the “zone of privacy”
justification that is commonly cited, but also went on to articulate

249

Id. at 397-98.
Id. at 399 (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512).
251
Id. at 401-02.
252
Id. at 397-399.
253
Id. at 398; Kirst, supra n. 66, at 233.
254
In re Cedant Corp. Securities Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003);
Whitlow v. Martin, 2009 WL 2241152 at *3 (Fed. Cl. 2009); Abdell v. City of
New York, 2006 WL 2664313 at *3 (S.D. N.Y. 2006); Am. Fed. Bank v.
United States, 60 Fed.Cl. 493, 497 (Fed. Cl. 2003); Epstein, supra n.8, at 815;
Marcus, supra n.11, at 349-50; WRIGHT ET AL., supra n.11, § 2024; Charles P.
Cercone, The War Against Work Product Abuse: Exposing the Legal Alchemy
of Document Compilations as Work Product, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 639, 658
(2003).
250
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the beneficial effect the doctrine would have on the legal
profession and the attorney-client relationship. Finally, the
Court’s distinction of how “ordinary” work product prepared
“with an eye toward litigation” is to be treated differently from
“core” work product emphasizes the special protection the Court
felt core work product should receive.255
With regard to this last point, the Upjohn opinion is as
insightful for what it does not say as for what it does; namely, the
complete lack of discussion of whether the work product at issue
was prepared in “anticipation of litigation.” Consider the time
period during which the interview notes were created – from
January 1976 to March 1976. This was prior to Upjohn reporting
to the SEC or IRS and was merely part of the company’s own
internal investigation.256 In other contexts, lower courts have
found such material to be beyond the protection of the work
product doctrine because it was not prepared “in anticipation of
litigation.”257 Yet the Supreme Court did not discuss this as a
requirement in its analysis but instead, moved forward on the
assumption that the material in question was “work product.” It
may be that this omission is simply because the issue was not
raised by the parties nor addressed by the Magistrate. But given
the timeline of events, it seems odd that the Court would remand
when it could have just as easily upheld the Magistrate’s ruling on
the ground that the “core” work product at issue was still subject
to the “anticipation of litigation” requirement. Perhaps what can
be taken from this is that the Supreme Court was not terribly
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Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399 (1981).
See Leslie Wharton et al., 2 Successful Partnering Between Inside and
Outside Counsel §33:32 (“The work product at issue had been created long
before the contested tax summons was issued, and even before Upjohn had filed
the report with the government that instigated the IRS's investigation.”).
257
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. at 156; Guzzino, 174 F.R.D. at
63; Epstein, supra n.8, at 831 (citing same). See also Smith, supra n.64, at 35
(“Because the work product doctrine is narrower in scope than the attorneyclient privilege in that it only applies when litigation is ongoing or pending, an
entity must next determine whether the investigation is being conducted as a
result of pending litigation.”); Imperato, supra n.64, at 216 (“The key to this
protection is that the work must be performed in anticipation of litigation.”).
256
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concerned with the temporal scope of the doctrine, at least where
“core” work product was at issue.258
IV.The anticipation misconception
After reviewing opinions subsequent to Hickman as well as
the discussions regarding the formulation of Rule 26(b), it is clear
that a number of courts and commentators have assumed that
Hickman intended work product protection to apply only to
material generated in “anticipation of litigation.” However, as has
been shown, a careful review of Hickman reveals no such
requirement. Indeed, quite to the contrary, the Court’s discussion
of core work product as well as the policy discussion justifying the
doctrine would seem to indicate that protection should be afforded
to core work product, regardless of any temporal or motivational
link to litigation. Indeed, much of the confusion surrounding this
issue seems to stem from the Developments Note, which offered
scant support for its conclusion. Thus it could be said that courts
258

The Supreme Court may soon have a chance to clarify this portion of its
ruling. In United States v. Textron, Inc., a very recent case decided by an en
banc panel of the First Circuit, the court held that “tax accrual work papers”
prepared by Textron’s lawyers and others within Textron’s tax department,
were not protected by the work product doctrine. United States v. Textron, Inc.,
577 F.3d 21, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2009)(en banc). The “tax accrual work papers” at
issue were created to help Textron create a tax reserve from which to draw
money should some of its positions on its tax liability be incorrect. Id. at 23.
The court recognized that such papers could reveal the “soft spots” on Textron’s
tax return should the tax return be litigated. Id. at 23 (quoting United States v.
Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813 (1984)). However, looking to the
motivational component of the “anticipation of litigation” requirement, the
court held that the creation of the work papers was motivated by financial and
business concerns rather for use in future litigation. Id. at 27-28. As of this
writing, Textron has filed a Motion to Stay the Mandate Pending the Filing of a
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, meaning this issue could be before the Supreme
Court in the near future. See Textron, Inc.’s Motion to Stay the Mandate
Pending the Filing of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, filed August 21, 2009
(on file with author). For an excellent review of the Textron district court
opinion, see generally Claudine Pease-Wingenter, The Application of the
Attorney-Client Privilege to Tax Accrual Workpapers: The Real Legacy of
United States v. Textron, 8 HOUSTON BUS. & TAX L.J. 337 (2008).
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and commentators alike have been operating under an anticipation
misconception in that they have viewed the “anticipation of
litigation” standard as a bar to protection of “core” work product
that does not meet this requirement.
This misconception may be understandable when the role
of the lawyer is viewed historically. At the time of the Hickman
decision, in-house counsel only made up roughly 3 percent of all
attorneys and the work performed by these attorneys was rather
routine.259 Litigation and trial work were more heavily associated
with the work of an attorney than transactional or prophylactic
legal work.260 Indeed, up until the mid-1800s the attorney-client
privilege was also limited to trial work.261 Though the number of
in-house counsel had grown to 10.3 percent by 1970,262 by then
“anticipation of litigation” as a requirement had already taken
hold. However, today the role of the attorney is understood to
expand beyond just trial work into complex transactional work
which may, or may not ultimately require litigation.
A second, related misconception is also worth noting with
regard to Hickman. It is often written that the policy justification
for the work product doctrine is that the attorney requires a “zone
of privacy” within which to work.263 This justification is a nod to

259

THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 500, 505 (Kermit L. Hall, et al.
eds., Oxford 2002) (noting that “[i]n 1948, only 3 percent of all lawyers were
employed in private industry” and the role of the attorney, up until the 1960s,
was traditionally to handle routine legal issues while leaving more complex
legal issues for outside counsel).
260
See id. at 500 (“Corporate counsel traditionally acted as business counselors
and advisors to their employers concerning routine legal issues; more complex
legal issues were handled by the corporation’s outside counsel.”).
261
See note 57, supra.
262
Vern Countryman et al., THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 4 (2d ed., Little
Brown and Co. 1976). This growth appears to have been a steady incline
growing from 5.5 percent in 1951 to 8.9 percent in 1960. Id.
263
See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. United States, 69 Fed.Cl. 784, 789
(Fed. Cl. 2006) (asserting that the work product doctrine is intended to preserve
a zone of privacy where an attorney can prepare and develop his legal strategy);
Hobley v. Burge, 433 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2006) (identifying the purpose of
the work product doctrine as establishing a zone of privacy in which lawyers
can analyze their case free from interference by an adversary); Hanson v. U.S.
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the benefits that are viewed to result in a robust adversarial
system. However, to cite only to this adversarial justification
ignores the Hickman Court’s further statements with regards to the
detrimental effect disclosure of work product materials would
have on the legal profession as well as the attorney-client
relationship.264 In this regard, the work product doctrine’s
justification bears much in common with the instrumental
justification that is the foundation of the attorney-client privilege,
which is not tied to any litigation requirement.265 Indeed, even the
cost-free nature of the privilege could be found to apply to the
work product doctrine; instead of communications not existing
absent the privilege, the cost free nature is found in the Supreme
Court’s statement that “much of what is now put down in writing
would remain unwritten.”266
A.Correcting the anticipation misconception
In light of these misconceptions, a simple fix is possible:
eliminating the “anticipation of litigation” requirement for “core”
work product. This could be accomplished by simply extending
Hickman, which already continues to have validity today despite
Rule 26(b), and recognizing that “core” work product continues to
retain a residuum of protection even outside of the litigation
context.267 This would require a complete elimination of the
temporal analysis and a modification of the motivational analysis.
Instead of looking to whether the motivation for creating the work
product is litigation, the test should be whether the work product
sought was generated by the attorney to provide legal assistance.
Agency for Intern. Development, 372 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (indicating
that the work product doctrine serves to provide a zone of privacy within which
to plan for a case); United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir.
1998) (stating the purpose of the work product doctrine is to preserve a zone of
privacy in which an attorney can prepare their case).
264
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-13.
265
See Part II.B.2 supra.
266
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
267
Epstein, supra n.8, at 815; Marcus, supra n. 11, at 349-50; Cercone, supra
n.254, at 658; WRIGHT ET AL., supra n. 11, § 2024.
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This admittedly would mimic the test for whether a
communication is protected under the attorney-client privilege,268
but given the similar purposes of the doctrines, this is a logical
test. Though this may seem like a rather drastic proposal, a similar
expansion already exists under California state law269 and at least
one commentator has advocated for recognition of such an
expansion to protect the work of transactional attorneys.270
Such recognition of a residuum of protection would be in
line with the policy justifications of Hickman on both instrumental
and adversarial policy grounds. With regard to the instrumental
justification, as to “core” or “opinion” work product, if the
justifications for granting a qualified privilege within the litigation
context holds true, then those justifications should apply equally to
such materials outside the litigation context as well. As the
Supreme Court noted in Hickman, there could be a chilling effect
on the attorney-client relationship and “much of what is now put

268

See Kramer v. Raymond Corp., 1992 WL 122856 at * 1 (E.D. Pa. 1992);
MSF Holding, Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, 2005 WL 3338510 at *1 (S.D.
N.Y. 2005); Avianca, 705 F.Supp. at 676. Epstein, supra n.8, at 815; Marcus,
supra n.11, at 349-50; WRIGHT ET AL., supra n.11, § 2024; Cercone, supra
n.254, at 658.
269
Calif. Code of Civil Procedure § 2018.030(a) (West 2005) (“A writing that
reflects an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or
theories is not discoverable under any circumstances.”); County of Los Angeles
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 574 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000) (interpreting California’s work product rule); Wellpoint Health
Networks, Inc. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 59 Cal.App.4th
110, 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Rumac, Inc. v. Bottomley, 143 Cal.App.3d 810,
815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (contrasting the California rule with the Federal Rule).
270
See Kirst, supra n.66, at 230-35. Though Professor Kirst’s article is equally
critical of the “anticipation of litigation” requirement, and shares a similar line
of reasoning as to its analysis of Hickman and Upjohn, the Kirst article focuses
much more on a recognition of a transactional privilege based on a more
extensive review of the attorney-client privilege. This article does not limit the
scope of protection to a transactional privilege and is based more on the
historical and philosophical development of the work product doctrine. For a
contrary view of the work product doctrine, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg,
Rethinking Work Product, 77 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1517 (1991), in which
Thornburg argues that the work product doctrine should be eliminated entirely.
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271

down in writing would remain unwritten.”
Yet clients come to
attorneys for help both inside and outside of the litigation context
and the lawyer’s role outside of the litigation context is no less
important. As one California Appellate Court articulated in
explaining its legislature’s own decision to expand the scope of
coverage:
[P]rotecting attorneys' work product when they act
in a nonlitigation legal capacity furthers the
important goal of reducing the likelihood of
litigation. Although all litigators are attorneys, the
converse is not true. Nevertheless, “[t]he lawyer,
when acting as a counselor, performs a function
that is extremely beneficial to society, in that
effective legal counseling minimizes the likelihood
of conflict between parties by stabilizing
relationships and promoting understanding and
cooperation. Effective legal counselors provide the
'solvents and lubricants which reduce the frictions
of our complex society.' In the role of counselor,
the lawyer serves as an instrument of peace.”272
To limit the protection of core work product to only the litigation
context ignores this important policy justification for the rule as
enunciated in Hickman. 273
The expansion is also in line with the adversarial
justification given in Hickman. The “zone of privacy,” which
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Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
Rumac, Inc., 143 Cal. App.3d at 816 (quoting Edward D. Re, The Lawyer as
Counselor and the Prevention of Litigation, 31 CATH. U.L.REV. 685, 690-691
(1982)). See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH
CENTURY 461 (Yale Univ. Press 2002) (“Lawyers, in the main, service
business. They help form corporations, they advise on corporate affairs, they
maneuver through tangles of red tape; they cope with federal, state, and local
government; they help put deals together.”).
273
This instrumental justification is important as it continues to have validity, at
least in the Supreme Court’s view, in modern times. United States v. Zolin, 491
U.S. 554, 562-63 (1989); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996);
Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408 (1998); IMWINKELRIED,
supra n.55, at 258-59 (citing Zolin, Jafee, and Swindler & Berlin).
272
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recognized that attorneys must work without fear that the
opponent would gain important insight into his or her strategy
decisions is applicable even at stages when litigation is only a
remote possibility. Indeed, the “core” work product of an attorney
who is engaged to avoid litigation, even at an early stage when no
litigation is on the horizon, can still give helpful insight into how a
party will prepare its case or give helpful insight into the strategy
that will be used at trial. The following example is illuminating:
For instance, an attorney who prepares a
memorandum on the strengths and weaknesses of a
contract he has drawn up for a client might modify
his handling of future memoranda if he knew such
documents were routinely discoverable. The
memorandum, if discovered, could provide some
unforeseen adversary with insights into weaknesses
that he had not detected on his own.274
A recognition that a residuum of protection remains under
Hickman would help alleviate this concern.
B.Justifications for retaining the “anticipation” requirement
Despite the strengths of the arguments in favor of
recognition of expansion of the coverage of work product
protection, there are a number of countervailing arguments that
should be addressed. The first is the argument that an attorney
working in a non-litigation context will have no fear of discovery
and thus no chilling effect on his work product would occur. This
was the reasoning put forth in the previously discussed
Developments Note that appears to have helped establish the
“anticipation of litigation” requirement. As has already been
explained, the Developments Note’s reasoning seems naïve at

274

Anderson, supra n.7, at 788, n.175. The footnote prefaces that “[a]lthough
rule 26(b)(3) focuses on litigation, there is no reason to believe that the
Hickman rationale is so limited. Arguably, the courts should protect a broader
range of attorney work product.” Id. The footnote concludes, however, that
protection could be available through the attorney-client privilege or a
protective order. Id.
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best, particularly in light of modern legal practices. Attorneys
engaged in any arena of modern day transactional work, such as
negotiating and reviewing contracts, drafting wills, administering
tax advice or working on patent prosecution, are aware that
litigation may ensue. Indeed, given the relative permanence an
attorney’s work has thanks to electronic storage, in modern times,
this justification for retaining the requirement as to “core” work
product has little bite.
Another, more compelling argument against removing the
requirement is that it cuts against the purposes of the Rules. The
original Rules were enacted to open discovery up so that cases
were won or lost based on justice rather than gamesmanship. To
cut back on discovery in such a way could open up opportunities
for abuses by parties and a return to the gamesmanship that
marked the pre-Rules era. This argument would be more
persuasive if what was being proposed was a complete
abandonment of the “anticipation of litigation” requirement. The
expansion argued for is only with regard to the “core” work
product of the attorney. The “anticipation of litigation”
requirement makes sense as to “ordinary” work product and is in
line with the balance struck as to the adversarial nature of the work
product exception. Placing a burden for discovery of such
materials on a party seeking “ordinary” work product outside of
the litigation context would be overly burdensome and potentially
could heighten the gamesmanship that was inherent in the system
prior to enactment of the Rules. However, as to “core” or
“opinion” work product, if the justifications for granting a
qualified privilege articulated in Hickman are to be believed, then
the benefits of protection outweigh the negative effects feared.275

275

Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-13. It should be noted that even under such an
expansion of the work product doctrine, the exceptions of waiver and the crimefraud exception could still apply, further limiting the perceived damaging
effects such protection would have on an open discovery system. Contrast
Wellpoint, 59 Cal.App.4th at 120 (citing BP Alaska Exploration, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 199 Cal.App.3d 1240, 1249 (Cal. App. Ct. 1988) and noting
that, under California law, though waiver applied to the work product rule, the
crime-fraud exception did not).
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This leads, however, to possibly the strongest argument
against such a change. If the expansion of the work product
doctrine is to rely upon the instrumental policy justification that is
shared with the attorney-client privilege, then it must also suffer
from the weakness of this justification, i.e. that the perceived
benefits of the protection are speculative at best. Indeed, the work
product doctrine may be more susceptible to such an attack in light
of how long we have lived without such an expansion. It is
difficult to say that much of what is written down would not be,
and that the expansion is necessary to avoid a detrimental effect on
the attorney client relationship when no such expanded protection
has been afforded to core work product for approximately the last
80 years.276
To this there are a number of responses that can be offered.
First, though the instrumental justification is one justification for
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A corollary to this argument would be that protective orders are available
under Rule 26(c) to protect work product that is not covered under (b). See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(c). Cf. Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 408 (1989)
(“If a claim of corporate privilege is overridden because of the particular
evidentiary needs of the litigants, the court should be receptive to the
corporation's request for a protective order to minimize the risk of dissemination
of the attorney-client communications to the public or to parties in other
proceedings.”). However, as has already been demonstrated, despite the
availability of such a measure, problems have persisted as to the discovery of
“core” work product. Indeed, the Rule itself speaks in terms that do no not lend
the reader to think that simply by virtue of having “core” work product status,
that protection should be granted as it states, “[a] party or any person from
whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court where
the action is pending . . .. The court may, for good cause, issue an order to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (A) forbidding the
disclosure or discovery . . ..” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (emphasis added). Also, the
presence of a “good cause” justification is problematic as this was the precise
language that was rejected by the Advisory Committee as being unacceptable
with regard to protecting work product due to confusion as to its meaning. See
part III.C., supra. In fact, a court could simply return to the “anticipation of
litigation” analysis to determine if a protective order was justified. See, e.g., In
re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. at 133 (denying request for protective
order as the material at issue was not produced in anticipation of litigation).
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expansion of the doctrine, it is not the only one. The expansion of
the doctrine is also in line with the adversarial justification
articulated in Hickman as has been noted above. Indeed, it is
interesting to note that though the attorney-client privilege has
long stood upon the speculative instrumental justification, one of
the primary alternative justifications that has been offered up for
its continued existence is a humanistic privacy justification, which
would seem to mirror the adversarial justification given for the
work product doctrine.277
Furthermore, while there has been no protection for such
materials in the past, today’s legal environment is much different
from the one in which Hickman was decided, or the one in which
the current version of Rule 26(b) was effected, or even the legal
environment of ten years ago. This is due to both the growth of
legal profession as a whole and in the in-house sector, as well as
the advent of electronic discovery. In 1948, the time Hickman was
decided and when the Rules were under consideration for
amendment, in-house counsel accounted for 3 percent of all
attorneys,278 of which there were approximately 200,000 (placing
the number of in-house at approximately 6,000).279 The work of
these in-house attorneys was relatively routine, but through the
years grew to encompass increasingly complex matters.280 By
1970, the year in which the work product doctrine became a part
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the total number of attorneys had
grown to 355,242 of which 11 percent worked in-house (placing
the number of in-house counsel at approximately 39,076) .281 This
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See notes 166-173, supra and accompanying text.
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 500, 504-505 (Kermit L. Hall,
et al. eds., Oxford 2002).
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See GLENN GREENWOOD, THE 1961 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 88
(American Bar Foundation 1962) (placing the total number of attorneys in the
U.S. in 1951 at 221,605).
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THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 500, 505 (Kermit L. Hall, et al.
eds., Oxford 2002); VERN COUNTRYMAN, ET AL, THE LAWYER IN MODERN
SOCIETY 41, 44 (Little, Brown and Co. 1976).
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BARBARA A. CURAN ET AL., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A
STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980S 12
(American Bar Foundation 1985); VERN COUNTRYMAN, ET AL, THE LAWYER IN
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percentage leveled out over the next few decades, with in-house
representing 10 percent of the total number of attorneys in 1980,
of which there were 542,205 (placing the number of in-house at
approximately 54,000),282 8 percent in 1995 (with a total number
of approximately 71,349 in-house)283 and 8.4 percent in 2000 (for
a total number of in-house counsel of 75,954).284 In 2008, the
total number of attorneys in the U.S. had reached 1,014,000 and
though no percentage of in-house counsel number appears
available yet, if the percentage remains in the 8-10 percent range,
this would place the number of in-house counsel somewhere
between 81,120 and 101,400. Even going by a conservative
estimate, this growth represents a significant increase in the raw
numbers from 1948, and over a doubling of the number of inhouse counsel since 1970. When the advent of e-discovery is
coupled with this growth in the numbers and use of in-house
counsel, there is a great likelihood that, as a practical matter,
materials exist today that simply would not have been discovered
at the time of Hickman.
The advent and regular use of computers and electronic
storage of materials has created an environment in which every
key stroke is recorded and recoverable. Notes, drafts and other
material, which may very well have disappeared in hard copy,
particularly after a few years, either through a document
destruction program or simply by accident (we all know how
unorganized some attorneys can be), are now discoverable through
e-discovery measures. This has led to a large increase in the
amount of discoverable information.285 It has also led to an

MODERN SOCIETY 4 (Little, Brown and Co. 1976) (placing the percentage at
10.3 percent).
282
CURAN, supra n.281, at 12; FRIEDMAN, supra n.272, at 461.
283
CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL
PROFESSION IN 1995 7 (American Bar Foundation 1999).
284
CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL
PROFESSION IN 2000 28 (American Bar Foundation 2004). The total number of
attorneys in the U.S. had grown to over 1 million. Id. at 27.
285
Tracey L. Boyd, The Information Black Hole: Managing the Issues Arising
from the Increase in Electronic Data Discovery in Litigation, 7 VAND. J. ENT.
L. & PRAC. 323, 323-25 (2005) (“Without question, the amount of
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increase in the ability to easily search through the vast amount of
information to discover previously difficult to locate documents
and information.286 As one commentator as characterized it, “[t]he
data mountain is no longer an impossible height to scale, but a vast
database to be mined for secrets and insights that were previously
unavailable.”287 Based on the above, there are two significant
changes that have occurred since Hickman; first is the increase in
proportion and sheer number of lawyers used in-house (and for
increasingly complex matters). Second, though the proportion of
attorneys may have steadied by the time the work-product doctrine
was recognized in Rule 26(b), the nature of discovery has changed
dramatically since that time. Thus, if discovery of “core” work
product was not a concern as a practical matter at the time of
Hickman or in 1970, the same certainly cannot be said today.288

[electronically] discoverable information greatly exceeds the quantity that is
available through traditional discovery.”); Steven C. Bennett & Thomas M.
Niccum, Two Views From the Data Mountain, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 607, 60708 (2003); Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in
Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 up to the Task? 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 349
(2000).
286
Bennett, supra n.272, at 610-11.
287
Id.
288
For example, a review of the number of ALI/ABA published CLEs regarding
discovery reveals a substantial increase since 1988, with the largest increase
coming since 2004. See www.westlaw.com (search “American Law InstituteAmerican Bar Association Continuing Legal Education (ALI-ABA)” database
by inputting “ti(Discovery) & da(1988)” to find the number of ALI/ABA
articles with the word “discovery” in the title; repeat for every year up to 2009).
As the chart below demonstrates, the results of this search show that the number
of articles with “discovery” in the title greatly increased starting in 2004;
illustrating that more emphasis is being put on issues of discovery in the legal
community. This increase may very well be related to the 2006 amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure involving electronic discovery, which were
being discussed prior to their effective date. Indeed, a review of the titles from
2004 onward reveals that a number of the CLEs included the words “electronic”
or “e-discovery” in their title.
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Finally, though it can be argued that the benefit is
speculative, there is evidence, both anecdotally and by analogy to
studies done in the attorney-client privilege context that would
suggest otherwise. Anecdotally, it is not difficult to find attorneys
with war stories about discovery battles and guarding against what
was said or written down to avoid a paper trail that could be
discovered later by an adversary.289 Empirically, there is some
support that the attorney-client privilege provides more than
“speculative” benefits. In 2005, the Association of Corporate
Counsel (“ACC”) conducted a survey of its members to determine
whether the attorney-client privilege was under attack by
governmental agencies.290 Of the 363 respondents to the ACC
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Cf. JOHN W. GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE 7-10 (2d
ed. Garland Law Publ’g 1990) (noting that without the protection, in the
litigation context, counsel would “be forced to balance the benefit of creating
work product with the risk that his adversary can readily obtain it”).
290
Association of Corporate Counsel Executive Summary, Association of
Corporate Counsel: Is the Attorney-Client Privilege Under Attack?, at 1 (Apr.
6, 2005), available at http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient.pdf.
Additionally, in his 1989 survery concerning the effects, if any, of the attorney
client privilege, Professor Vincent Alexander found that with respect to
corporate representatives, 62% of in-house counsel, 88.5% of outside counsel,
and 75% of executives said that in their opinion the attorney-client privilege
encourages candor. Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 246, 261
(1989). While this survey is twenty years old, and therefore not necessarily a
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survey, 93% believed that senior-level employees of corporate
clients were aware of the attorney-client privilege and relied upon
it when consulting corporate counsel.291 This number dropped to
68% for mid and lower-tier employees.292 Significantly, however,
95% of the respondents believed that absent the attorney-client
privilege, there would be a chilling effect of the flow of
information from clients.293 The National Association of Defense
Counsel conducted a similar study around the same time period
which similarly found that 95% of its respondents felt that if the
attorney-client privilege did not protect its communications or
work product, there would be a chilling effect on the candid flow
of information.294 Furthermore, 94% of respondents believed that
the privilege enhanced the likelihood that company employees
would discuss difficult issues of legal compliance with the
attorney and 97% believed that the privilege enhanced the
“lawyer’s ability to monitor/enforce/improve compliance

representation of circumstances today, the conclusions it draws, along with the
conclusions promulgated by the Association of Corporate Counsel in their 2005
survey, provide a strong basis of support for the contention that the attorneyclient privilege provides more than speculative benefits. Compare Vincent C.
Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the
Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 414 (1989) (stating that the evidence
gathered in this study contains more evidence than any other study to date that
the attorney-client privilege encourages candor in communications between an
attorney and his client) with Association of Corporate Counsel Executive
Summary, Association of Corporate Counsel: Is the Attorney-Client Privilege
Under Attack?, at 2-3 (Apr. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient.pdf (finding, just as Professor
Alexander did twenty years ago, that a vast majority of attorney’s believe there
would be a chilling effect on candid communication without the attorney client
privilege).
291
Association of Corporate Counsel Executive Summary, Association of
Corporate Counsel: Is the Attorney-Client Privilege Under Attack?, at 2-3 (Apr.
6, 2005), available at http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient.pdf.
292
Id.
293
Id.
294
Executive Summary, NACDL Survey: The Attorney-Client Privilege is Under
Attack, at 1-3, available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/freeform/attorneyclient?OpenDocument.
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295

initiatives.”
These surveys, however, were of the attorneys and
not of clients and could themselves be attacked as speculative (in
that the attorneys are speculating upon what their clients would or
would not reveal) and self-serving.296 It may be, on this front,
until a convincing empirical study is completed, that the benefits
derived from the attorney-client privilege may have to remain
“speculative,” but, given the above justifications for expanding the
coverage as to “core” work product, this flaw should not be fatal.
This is particularly true given that the attorney-client privilege has
existed on this same speculative benefit for many decades.
A final argument that could be made against adoption of
recognizing a residuum of protection for core work product is that
it will be subject to abuse – that attorney’s will become mere tools
by which powerful clients, such as corporations, can protect
documents from exposure simply by having attorneys work on
matters, be they related to the attorney’s legal expertise or not. As
an initial response, I would again point out that recognizing a
residuum of protection would not mean an abandonment of
exceptions to the work product doctrine such as the crime-fraud
exception or waiver. A corporation or client that wishes to utilize
an attorney to commit a fraud would still be subject to producing
the resultant work product. Furthermore, just as is true with the
attorney-client privilege, simply using an attorney would not lead
to protection under the work product doctrine. The work would
still need to be generated by the attorney to provide legal
assistance (and would still be a qualified privilege). Thus,
involving an attorney in routine business matters would not lead to
protection. While it is true that recognition of a residuum of
protection could lead to expanded protection of certain documents,
this proposal is by no means intended to completely displace the
295

Association of Corporate Counsel Executive Summary, Association of
Corporate Counsel: Is the Attorney-Client Privilege Under Attack?, at 4 (Apr.
6, 2005) available at http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient.pdf.
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This possibility was recognized by Professor Vincent in his 1989 survey in
which he noted that the “bias of the participants must be taken into account in
weighing the accuracy of the results. . . .One may reasonably suspect . . . that
the role of the privilege as an incentive to candor was exaggerated by the
participants.” Vincent, supra n.57, at 263.
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balance struck with a system of open discovery. Instead,
recognition of a residuum of protection would strike a proper
balance, within the dictates of the Hickman decision, between
having a system of open discovery and retaining a level of
protection for documents under both a humanistic privacy
justification and also an instrumental justification. And while
some may take issue with such an expansion and re-balancing,
citing the need for more rather than less discovery, many of the
criticisms that could be levied against such an approach could
easily be levied against the Hickman decision itself. However, as
valid as such criticisms may be, the battle to do away with any
level of protection for work product has been fought and lost long
ago. Recognition of a residuum of protection would merely do
away with the arbitrary lines that are currently being drawn
regarding “anticipation of litigation.”
V.

Conclusion

The anticipation misconception has lingered for far too long.
Rather than attempt to stretch the existing attorney-client privilege
to include “core” work product or broaden “anticipation of
litigation” to encompass any work created by the attorney,
however speculative the litigation may be, a sounder approach
would be to simply recognize that a residuum of protection exists
under Hickman that provides a separate protection for “core” work
product. This is possible through the original Hickman decision
itself, which even today has validity despite the existence of Rule
26(b). A recognition that “core” work product is protected, even if
that protection is not absolute, despite the absence of potential
litigation, is more in line with the duel policy justifications
articulated by the Court in Hickman. The first of these policy
justifications, to promote the adversarial system by providing a
“zone of privacy,” is advanced by a rule that protects “core” work
product as, even when litigation may be remote, the attorney’s
mental impressions could just as easily be used against the
attorney’s clients in a litigation context as documents produced
explicitly in anticipation of litigation. Removing the “anticipation
of litigation” requirement for “core” work product will also
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promote the second, instrumental justification given by the
Supreme Court. This justification, rooted in a concern that
without protection, there would be a detrimental effect on the
attorney-client relationship, and much of what is written down
would not be written down, shares much in common with its
cousin, the attorney-client privilege. And just as the attorneyclient privilege is not tied to litigation, neither should the
protection of “core” work product. While the benefits may appear
speculative, on balance, this benefit has been sufficient to justify
the existence of other privileges, and the work product doctrine
has the added benefit of having a duel justification in its first
adversarial justification, which is also similar to the humanistic
privacy justification that has been offered for the attorney-client
privilege.
Furthermore, the term “anticipation of litigation” has failed to
yield a uniform or satisfactory definition – a problem that should
concern both practitioners and academics alike. To demonstrate,
imagine that fictional company ABC Corp., prior to any formal
governmental investigation, assigns in-house counsel to
investigate possible accounting irregularities. In-house counsel
begins researching cases and statutes and makes notes regarding
how such authorities could affect the company’s liability. While
doing this, in-house counsel also sets up a schedule to interview
employees and third parties over a four week time frame. Two
weeks into the interviews and while research is still being done on
the legal issues, the SEC and Department of Justice begin a formal
investigation. In some jurisdictions, the work product from the
first two weeks, including the attorney’s notes from the interviews
would not be protected as the possibility of litigation was remote.
However, the second two-week period, after the formal
investigations had begun, would be covered as in “anticipation of
litigation.” Such a distinction makes little sense and creates an
incentive for in-house counsel to avoid writing down his or her
mental impressions. Thus, eliminating the “anticipation of
litigation” requirement for “core” work product in favor of a rule
that simply protects such documents will help promote some
degree of uniformity and provide attorneys with a degree of
certainty about whether their work will be protected. The
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inconsistent opinions that have resulted from the “anticipation of
litigation” requirement have led to results that make distinctions
without any true meaning. By simply recognizing that “core”
work product is deserving of protection regardless of the prospect
of litigation, so long as it is truly provided as part of an attorney’s
provision of legal services, should, at the very least, provide courts
with the ability to grant or deny protection in a more rational
manner.
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